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Introduction
For the past 1 7 years, Historical Perspeclives
has existed to showcase exemplary student research
from the History Department at Santa Clara
University. The journal also allows Santa Clara
students the experience of publishing their research
during their undergraduate sludies. This journal is
published annually with the assistance of the Lambda
Upsilon Chapter of Phi Alpha Theta in order to further
the pursuit of historical inquiry.
The papers included within Lhis edition do not
all follow a similar theme, but rather encompass a
variety of topics from different areas and ages. With
Renee Lucas' The New York World's Fair of 1939: The
Marketing of a 'Corporale Ulopia' we are introduced to
the importance of American leisure activities as a
reflection of society. Brigid Eckhart's Small Boys are
Big Men: Experiences and Reflections f ram Child
Soldiers Fighting in Sierra Leone and Brigid Kelleher's
Drug Abuse in Vietnam: The Underapprecialed Casualty
of War introduces the problems of modern warfare
through, respectively, the use of child soldiers and the
impact of drug abuse.
Melissa Johnson's ReEvaluation of Self: An Examinalion of lhe Polilical and
Personal Outlooks of While America and JapaneseAmericans on the Po s t-World War 11 Era, Christina
Lynch's Political Theatre and Political Myths: Robert
Kennedy, George Wallace and the Show Down at
Tuscaloosa, and Robert Philbrook's Missed
Opportunities lo Bridge lhe Racial Divide: The Creation
of the First SWAT Team as a Response lo Black
Radicalism all deal wi th issues of race in contemporary
United Stales history. Through lhe breadth of student
submissions it is possible Lo see the scope and
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dedication of the History department's students and
faculty in the pursuit of original and thorough
historical research.
We would like to take this opportunity to thank
all those who have made this publication possible.
First and foremost, without the support and dedication
of the Santa Clara faculty who have fostered a love of
history among students, none of these papers would
have been possible. To all of the students who
submitted papers for consideration, we would like to
extend our appreciation for your hard work. The high
quality of submissions made the selection of paper
exciting and very challenging. ln addition, we offer our
thanks to Professors Brigitte Charaus and Fabio
Lopez-Lazaro for their assistance with the student
editorial board, and to Mrs. Judy Gillette, who was
invaluable in helping with submissions and
publication.
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Enjoy!
Elaine Anderson and Maryann Lucini
Student Editorial Board
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1

Small Boys are Big Men: Experiences
and Reflections from Child Soldiers
Fighting in Sierra Leone
Brigid Eckhart
"I was then a small boy, but I considered myself a
big man."1
Introduction
A brutal civil war raged for over a decade in Lhe
West African nation of Sierra Leone, and child soldiers
were used by all sides. Yet loo little remains understood about the experiences of these children. Speaking lo the difficulties in accessing and explaining the
role of child soldiers in this conflicl, human rights
organizations have variously referred to these children
as bolh victims and perpetrators of human rights
abuses. Their dual roles were reflected in their participation with the various armed groups involved in the
civil war. An examination of the experiences of child
soldiers reflects both significant variations and similarities within and among factions.
The civil war began in 1991 when a small, multinational force crossed into Sierra Leone from Liberia.
This group, the Revolutionary United Front for Sierra
Leone (RUF/SL) led by Foday Sankoh, declared as its
goal the overthrow of the corrupt regime of the All
1

Master Japo 's testimony before the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, from Appendix: Three: Part Two,
Transcripts of Public Hearings Held in the District Headquarter
Towns, Afternoon Session of Closed Hearing Held in Bo 011 l
May 2003, 125.
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People's Congress. 2 The incursion turned into war
when the ill-equipped and poorly trained Sierra Leone
Army failed to stop the RUF /SL. When the war became
vicious, few outside the region responded. With little
press beyond the occasional report of blood diamonds,
bn1tal amputations, or child soldiers, international
pressure to terminate hostilities was slow to materialize.
The war ultimately affected all of Sierra Leone,
engaging diverse groups who played ambiguous, and
often dubious, roles in the confiict, prolonging and
intensifying it. These included the Liberian leader
Charles Taylor, the mostly Nigerian Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG), the private military contractor Executive
Outcomes, the UN Mission in Sierra Leone, and
international diamond giants. The war went through
different stages, including points when the RUF/SL
seemed to be routed, and produced two coups d'etat,3
three peace agreements,4 and two elections.
2

J. Peter Pham, Child Soldiers, Adult interests: The Global
Dimensions of the Sierra Leone Tragedy (New York: Nova Science
Publishers, Inc., 2005), 83. This original insurgent group
composed of NPFL (National Patrio t Fro nt of Liberia) soldiers,
Burkinabes, and Sierra Leon eans, crossed into Sierra Leone on
March 23, 1991.
3
For more information about these coups d'etat see Gberi e,
A Dirty War, 97-113.
• The first agreement, Abidjan 1996, secured the rule of
President Kabbah by ending hostilities. The Conakry Peace Plan
of 1997 restored Kabbah to power af"ler lhc AFRC takeover. The
Lome Peace Agreement 1999 was supposed to end all fighting
after the RUF /SL's Freetown take over in January 1999. Peace
was finally enforced through the dPployment of UN troops and
assistance from British P'orces, and declared hostilities were
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Throughout these changing situations child soldiers emerged as emblematic of the civil war and its
brutality, as images of young boys with AK 4 7s slung
over their shoulders were featured in Western media.
Children fought on all sides of this war, including with
the RUF /SL, the Civil Defense Forces (CDF) , or
lcamajors, and the government army, the Republic of
Sierra Leone Military Force (RSLMF or SLA). 5 Sierra
Leone was not alone in its use of children as combatants. Children have fought in Columbia's con!lict,
joined both Protestants and Catholics in Northern
Ireland, and participated in the Palestinian conflict, to
cite a few examples. 6 Other wars in Africa have
deployed young troops as well; in particular Joseph
Kony's Lord's Resistance Army. Though these are
recent cases, the Nazis deployed Hitler Youth towards
the end of World Wax 11. 7 Despite the presence of
young combatants in m a ny past wars, sorne recent
circumstances may suggest why many contemporary
wars involve so many young participants. 8 Contem
declared over in January 2003 by the UN. (See both Gberie, /\
Dirty War and J. Peter Pham, Child Soldiers, Adult interests.)
5
The CDF were not always lcamajors, which is a Mende word
for hunter, other ethnic groups and political parties at various
points also organized Civil Defense Forces. The RSLMF is
described by Peters and Richards as ill-equipped and as
mimicking the tactics of the RUF /SL by training children to
fight. Krijn Peters and Paul Richards, "'Why We Fight': Voices of
Youth Combatants in Sierra Leone ," Africa68 2( 1998) : 184 .
6
P.W . Singer, Children al War (New York: Pantheon Books,
2005), 16.
7
Cockerill, Sons, 1-6.
8
It might likewise be interesting lo address why war often
excludes, rather than includes, c hildren. The reasons why
children are excluded or iucluJ ed cou ld relate to differing
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porary conflicts have proliferated small arms sufficiently light weight and easily operated- not to mention inexpensive -that even small children can fire
them. 9
Before addressing the case of Sierra Leone, it is
important to consider differing culturally determined
definitions of the child soldier. 10 Despite cultural
variations, international standards define a "child" as
those under the age of 18, with specific rights and
protections accorded them. While the most widely
accepted standard prohibits individuals under 15 from
participating in armed conflict, the Optional Protocol
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child raises the
standard to 18, the age UNICEF uses in its definition
of child soldiers. 11 Using either age classification,
many children, both boys and girls, fought in Sierra
Leone.

I
I
I
I

culture conceptions of appropriate ages; however this additional
facet is beyond the scope of this study.
9
Singer, Children, 45-6 ..
10
As is often a rgued many international standards set by
the UN Declaration of Human Rights were au thored from a
distinctly Western perspective, which may ignore cultural and
moral relativisms. However, these distinctions speak more to
questions of the genera l validity of international laws., than to
this precise issue.
11
UNICEF has defined a child so ldier as "any child - boy or
girl - under 18 years of age, who is part of any kind of regular or
irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including,
but not limited to: cooks, porters, messengers, and anyone
accompanying such groups other than family members . It
includes girls and boys recruited for forced sexual purposes
and/or forced marriage. The definition, therefore, does not only
refr:r to a chi ld who is carrying, or has carried, weapons." From
UNJCEF "Fact Sheet: Child Soldiers"
<http://www.unicef.org/protection/chiJdsoJdiers.pdf>.
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This study of child combatants in Sierra Leone
engages a range of primary sources. By drawing on
published interviews from a variety of sources, especially the transcripts of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC) in Sierra Leone, and olher sources,
a sketch of the lived experiences of child combalants
emerges. 12 Another significant contribution to this
study is Ishmael Bea.h's A Long Way Gone: Memoirs of
a Boy Soldier, which chronicles his years fighting with
the army. Particular attcnlion will be paid to the
combatants' self-representation and experiences in
war. Also, the particular realities of girl soldiers will be
analyzed.
Previous scholarship has addressed the civil war
12

Intriguingly, these transcripts represent a re latively
untapped source for scholarly research. Also, it is important to
recognize that interviews can ufle11 be µrobl ematic, especially
when using interviews others conducted, where questions were
chosen by others. The TRC material includ es multiple narrative
testimonies of former child soldiers and others who encountered
them, followed by questioning by the Commission. However,
even these invaluable sources have some limitations . The
majority who shared their stories in the transcripts available
fought with the RUF /SL, which leaves little information for
comparison to those children who fought with the CDF and the
RSLMF. Notwithstanding these frustrating gaps of information,
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission transcripts provide
details and a quantity of accounts not found elsewhere. The
interviews and testimony were given originally in whatever
language the individual was most comfortable. The
transcriptions of these accounts were later translated into
English for the publication of the document used here Witness lo
Truth: Report of the Sierra Leo /le Truth alld Reconciliation
Commission, Aµµendices, retrieved from <
http://www.trcsierra!conc.org/ pdf/APPENDICES/Appendices%
20Content%20Page.pdf>.
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and the role of child soldiers. Sierra Leone scholar
Paul Richards takes issue with Robert Kaplan's widely
publicized "New Barbarism" theory, which asserts that
a senseless and criminally brutal form of warfare-exemplified in the Sierra Leone war-has recently emerged. 13 In contrast, Richards focuses on the
political motivations driving the violence . Some of his
work addresses child soldiers explicitly, including a
piece published with Krijn Peters containing interviews
with young combatants. 14 William Murphy analyzes
the children's relationships with their commanders,
viewing these relationships as a version of the
patrimonialism characteristic of Sierra Leone's postindependence government. 15 The commander or bra' 6
13

The so-r.c1llerl "New Barbarism" Theory was developed by
Robert D. Kaplan in his article "The Coming Anarchy" from
Atlantic Monthly, February 19':)6,
<http://www.globa Ipolicy .org/ nations/ future/ kaplan7 .htm>.
Through a variety of examples of sprawling poverty and city
slums, as well as examples of violence in developing nations,
Kaplan seeks to explain how those contemporary examples
forebode a new type of world order, or disorder, where violence
reigns, and a new type of purposeless war is waged for the sake
of violence and criminality itself. This theory was examined in
Paul Richard s's Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth, &
Resources in Sie1Ta Leone (Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann, 1996).
14
Peters, "'Why We Fight."'
15
First, aid organizations view them as "coerced youth," or
victims, who are generally lacking in personal agency,
susceptible to abduction, and thus in need of protection.
Second, the "revolutionary youth" model explains youth
involvement as a rebellion against a culture which marginalizes
them politically and economically. Third, the "delinquent youth"
image portrays child soldiers as economically exploiting their
wartime opportunities. Willia111 P. Murphy, "Military
Patrimonialism and Child Soldier Clientalism in the Liberian
and Sierra Leonean Civil Wars," African Studies Review, 46, no.
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of the child soldier protects, feeds, and watches over
the child, who in exchange is a fiercely loyal fighter.
Murphy posits that this relationship is a defining
feature of child soldiering in Sierra Leone. 17
David Rosen assesses the legacy of "youth thuggery" as a force in post-independence politics, manifested as an extension of the patrimonial state. 18 He
suggests that the growth of groups of alienated urban
youth emerged as urbanization facilitated both the
disintegration of family ties and generationally based
authority. 19 Rosen introduces the legacy of slavery,
including sexual slavery, forced labor, and slave
soldiery. Rosen's definition of a slave as someone
completely socially alienated from community and
family fits the condition of the captured children of the
RUF/ SL who were physically separated from their
farnilies. 20 Also, Rosen examines the warfare system
as part of the Poro system, a male secret association in
Mende society where initiated boys could be employed
as soldiers and considered ad ults. 21
2 (2003): 61-87.
16
Bra means "big brolher" in Krio, lhe mosl widely spoken
language in Sierra Leone.
11
Murphy, "Military Palrimonialism," 64-66 .
18
David M. Rosen, Armies of the Young: Child Soldiers in War
and Terrorism (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press,
2005).
19
Rosen, Armies of the Young, 59 .
20
Rosen, Armies of the Young, 59. Rosen also idenlifies that
lhere were reports of newly abducled recruils were forced lo kill
their own parents as an inlegral step of lhis brulal initiation
process.
21
Rosen, Armies of the Young, 58. Rosen applies the "New
Barbarism" lhesis lo lhe civil war, viewing the exlreme brutalily
of the war as evidence of ils va..lidily.
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Lansana Gberie disagrees with Richards's assertion
that the RUF /SL was a "misunderstood and misrepresented rural rebellion against the failed 'patrimonial'
state." 22 Instead, Gberie asserts that the RUF /SL had
no political ideology beyond attaining wealth and
power for Sankoh, and backer, Taylor. While Gberie
rejects Richards's attempt to articulate a RUF /SL
ideology where none seems to exist, he also disagrees
with Kaplan's assessment that youth, urban violence,
and overpopulation in Africa "have already reached
Gberie critiques Kaplan's sparse
crisis point." 2 3
experience and by extension his broad conclusions. 24

The Experiences of Child Soldiers in Sierra Leone
An analysis of the child soldiers' words reveals
these former fighters as vulnerable, exploited and
sometimes as killers. Many express their fears, their
difficulties coping with their actions, and their hopes
of forgiveness for their dreadful deeds. Their testimonies share common themes and patterns as they
describe their time as child soldiers: abduction or
recruitment, fear, training, initiation, indoctrination,
sexual crimes, drugs, and experiences of killing.
Although significant variations exist among the interviews from the different groups-RUF/ SL, lcamajors,
CDF, RSLMF, and renegade national army combat22

Gberie, A Dirty War, 13.
Gberie, A Dirty War, 142.
24
Gberie engages both Kaplan and Richard's interpretations
extensively in his book, A Dirty War, see 141-5 for more
information. Also significant was the extensive circulation of
Kaplan's article, especially among US e mbassies throughout the
world, which may have impac ted US policy towards Africa
during this period.
23
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ants-many themes were similar. 25
There was more than one path to involvement as a
combatant, and these paths were generally related to
the faction joined. ln one survey of ex-combatants, the
majority of those surveyed who fought for the RUF/SL
were abducted, while a very small number of CDF
combatants surveyed reported forcible recruitment. 26
These survey results are substantiated by other
evidence. The RUF/ SL began a pattern of abductions
early on during the conflict, when its tactics of brutalizing the civilian population did not produce enough
volunteers. 2 7 Conversely, the CDF and other anti25

The "renegade national army" refers lo the sobel elements
discussed in nole 3. In this section, unless otherwise indicated,
the child soldier mentioned fought with the RUF/SL.
26
Macartan Humphreys, and Jeremy M. Weinstein, "What
the Fighters Say: A. Survey of Ex-Combatants in Sierra Leone ,
June-August 2003" (Center on Globalization and Sustainable
Development, Working Pape r No. 20, August 2004), 25 .
27
The vast majority of child soldiers interviewed through the
TRC were captured or abducted by the RUfi'/SL. See Fudie
Swarray's testimony before the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, from Appendix Three: Part Two, TranscriµLs of
Public Hearings Held in Lhe District Headquarter Towns, Closed
Hearings Held on 14 May 2003 in Kailahun, 283; Alex Jusu
Allieu's testimony before the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, from Appendix Three: Part Two, Transcripts of
Public Hearings Held in the District Headquarter Towns, Public
Hearings Held on 15 May 2003 in Kailahun. 290; Francis B.
Tucker's testimony before the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, from Appendix Three: Part Two, Transcripts of
Public Hearings Held in the District Headquarter Towns, Public
Hearings Held on 15 May 2003 in Kailahun, 296; and Master
Hassan Kamara's testimony before the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, from Appendix: Three: Part Two, Transcripts of
Public Hearings Held in the District Headquarter Towns, Ka mbia
District Closed Hearings , 11 June 2003, 755.
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RUF /SL contingents were able to attract Sierra
Leoneans wishing to protect their villages against
RUF/ SL campaigns of destruction.
Abduction or Recruitment?

Attacks on villages resulted in many deaths, while
the remainder, often young boys and girls, were
captured, many of them turned into soldiers, porters,
or sexual slaves. Many witnessed the death of parents
before being taken by the RUF /SL. One combatant,
Master Japo, abducted at age 10, reported being
"prepared to fight becaus e [he] had lost both
parents." 28 This loss, coupled with fear of being killed
if he refused, left him with no alternative but to fight
with the RUF/ SL. Many abductees related the fear
and threat of death if they refused to accompany the
rebels. 29 Fudie, 9 years old at capture, was at first
asked to carry loads, and reported that "the rebels
killed two of [the boys] simply because they said they
were unable to carry the luggage. "30
In contrast to the brutality that marked abduction
by the rebels, many of the children who fought with
the CDF volunteered to fight. Many of these youths
had also lost parents and had their homes and villages
destroyed; yet, instead of the resignation many
RUF /SL abductees felt toward their captors, the
intenriews suggest that some CDF and army soldiers
were often driven to seek revenge against the RUF /SL.
One RSLMF irregular described how the rebels had
28

Master Japo, 124-5.
For example, "He fired lwo shots in front of me and said if
I did not join them he would kill me." Alex Jusu Allieu, 290.
3
° Fudie Swarray, 283.
29
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taken his parents, and as a result he "tried to join the
army as a matter of revenging." 31 This combatant
related how he was incorporated into a fighting unit
through a system similar to the Poro system, in which
boys were initiated into adulthood and trained to
fight. 32 Another soldier stated that she "was defending
[her] country" as an irregular in RSLMF. 33
One
kamajor related that his armed participation fulfilled
his obligation to defend his people. 34 These accounts
suggest that CDF child combatants were more likely to
have volunteered than their RUF/SL counterparts.

Indoctrination/ Initiation/ Training
Indoctrination with RUF/ SL ideology often followed
abduction. The rebels appealed to children by offering
free education. 35 One child, Anthony, reported that
"they were telling us that we were not enjoying good
education under this go vernment; and that we should
have free education." 36 Physical initiation was another
form of indoctrination and often involved harsh treatment followed by shaving heads of abductees and/ or
inscribing "RUF" on the forehead or chest of the newly
31
Peters, "'Why We Fight,"' 189, see also 192 . An "irregular"
in lhe RSLMF was not recognized by the government and did not
receive any guaranteed compensation or proteclion.
32
Peters, "'W hy We Fight,"' 189.
33
Peters, "'Why We Fight,"' 191.
34
Pelers, '"Why We Fight,"' 196-7.
35
Francis B. Tucker, 299, and Anthony Andrew 'folio's
testimony before the Trulh and Reconcilialion Commission, from
Appendix: Three: Part Two, Transcripts of Pu blic Hearings Held
in the District Headquarter Towns, Kambia Dislrict Hearings, 12
June 2003, 774.
36
Anthony Andrew Tollo. 774. /\ minor transcriµLion error in
spacing has been changed in this quote.
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captured. 37 Fatmata noted that "la]t that time they
[RUF/ SL] had the practice of branding people, so that
you would not run away, even if you had the desire." 38
Coupled with the physical separation from their
families, the tattoo or inscription into the flesh of those
abducted further attenuated any ties with their former
communities. By outwardly manifesting their status
as rebels, the RUF /SL limited the children's ability to
escape and would eventually retard the process of
reintegration. Without much chance at acceptance if
they left the RUF /SL, they would be forced to integrate
into the only corporate group available to them-the
RUF /SL.
Starting with abduction, the RUF/ SL inculcated
norms of violence in its recruits, integrating them into
its organizational structure. Afraid that escape could
bring torture or death, abductees were transformed
into warriors following initia tion. Most underwent
some form of training, which ranged significantly in
scope and intensity, often involving weapons and
discipline training. Reports suggest that children died
" Fudie Swarray, 283.
Fatmata Jalloh's testimony before the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, from Appendix: Three: Part Two,
Transcripts of Public Hearings Held in the District Headquarter
Towns, Closed Hearings Held in Makeni on 28 May 2003, 481;
see also Mariama Mansaray's testimony before the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, from Appendix: Three: Part Two,
Transcripts of Public Hearings Held in the District Headquarter
Towns, Closed Hearings for in Koinadugu District, 4 May 2003,
385, and Kadiatu Sawaneh's testimony before the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, from Appendix Three: Part Two,
Transcripts of Public Hearings Held in Lhe District Headquarter
Towns, Public Hea1ings in Koinadugu District, 13 May 2003,
365.
38
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during these activities. Fudie described his training:
"They queued us up and lhey would send a gun lo us
and we were expected to catch it without allowing it lo
fall. As they sent the guns, we caught them. One
[child] ... allowed the gun lo fall and immediately he
was shot." 39 Another combatant, Alex, reported that
they were arranged in a straight line wilh "the gun on
our shoulder. If the gun was fired and you were not in
straight line, the bullet would hit you. The bullet hit
one boy on the head and he died." 4 ° Children were
taught to dodge bullets, wilh death coming to those
who failed. Master Bowanag added a scenario where
"[t]here was a hole over which a rope was hung .. . we
were requested lo go over lhe hole; swinging on the
rope. If one got tired and could no longer hold onto the
rope, one would fall into the hole and die." 41 By the
lime these children engaged in combat they would
have already seen many people killed, perhaps eroding
their aversion to death.
Other children, however, reported not undergoing
the type of training described by Fudie, Alex, and
Bowanag. Those seen as loo young for the training
camps were often lake11 as bodyguards under the
protection of their commander, or bra. Anthony, 13
when captured, staled Lhal he "was not allowed to
train early as I was clearly a child;" he also claimed
that his commander "loved [him] very much" and did
39
40

41

Fudie Swarray, 283.
Alex Jusu Allieu, 294.

Master Bowanag's testimony before the Truth and

Reconciliation Commission, from Appendix: Three: Part Two,
Transcripts of Public Hearings Held in the District Headquarter
Towns, Afternoon Session of Closed Hearing Held in Bo on l
May 2003, 118.
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not allow him to go to the training camps. 42 However,
since boys older than Anthony were sent to training
camps, his reason for not participating could indicate
wide variations among RUF /SL commanders with
regard to training.
Descriptions of the training of non-RUF /SL fighters
indicate that training was often limited to basic weapons instruction. One boy who joined the RSLMF as an
irregular at age 13 related that he "was trained to save
life and property" along with weapons training in the
AK 4 7, the RPG, and grenade launcher. 43 A soldier
who was recruited and trained by ULIMO at age 12,
Foday Sesay, reported undergoing "vigorous military
training for a month." 44 For child combatants, training
vacillated between deadly discipline and informal
instruction about guns.
Drug Culture
A culture of drugs among all groups often aided the
Reports
transformation of children into soldiers.
indicate a varying array of drugs distributed and
available to combatants, including marijuana, rum,
cigarettes, hard liquor, cocaine, palm wine, and a
gunpowder mixture. Although not all child combatants reported being exposed to drugs, many described
42

Anthony Andrew Tollo , 775-6, both the two previous
sentences quoted from Tollo.
43
Peters, '"Why We Fight,"' 190.
44
United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia
(ULlMO) was a group based in both Liberia and Sierra Leone
which aided the RUJ7 /SL . Ibrahim Abdullah and lshmail Rashid,
'"Smallest Victims; Youngest Killers': Juvenile Combatants in
Sierra Leone's Civil War," in Abdullah, Ibrahim, ed. Between

Democracy and Terror, 246.
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significant behavior alterations while intoxicated.
Combatants presented a variety of reasons for taking
drugs. Fudie, for in s tance, reported that after he
smoked marijuana he "could not distinguish between
grown ups and children." 45 Another youth, James,
described that the rebels "used to inject us with cocaine," and that "[a]fter l was given the injection l
didn't fear anything." 46 When questioned further,
James claimed that he would not have killed without
drugs. 47 Thus, Lhe drugs were used to reduce fear and
perhaps also to inhibit children's expressed aversions
to killing. Japo insisted that "without those drugs, we
couldn't work." Another combatant, Patrick Banagura,
admitted to using drugs, adding that he amputated a
man's hand because he "had been drugged." 48
ln addition to these RUF /SL combatants, several of
tl1e RSLMF irregulars r eported using drugs, claiming
that drugs aided them in fighting . One combatant
bought "drinks and smokes ... just to have some mind
[determination] to go and fight." 49 A female combatant
noted that "[ijf you take gunpowder before you sleep
you will wake with red [fierce] eyes" and that she "took
il lo become brave fo r battle." 50 An unnamed child,
45

Fudie Swarray, 284.
James Morseray's leslimony before th e Trulh and
Reconciliation Commission, from Appendix Three: Part Two,
Transcripls of Public Hearings He ld in lhe District Headquarter
Towns, Closed Hearings 1-!eld on 14 May 2003 in Kailahun, 277.
47
James Morseray , 277.
48
Master Palrick Bangura's les limony before lhe Truth and
Reconcilialion Co111missio11, from Appendix: Three: Part Two,
Transcripts of Public Hearings He ld in the District Headquarler
Towns, Kambia Dislricl Closed Hearings, 11 June 2003, 749.
49
Peters, '"Why We Fight,"' l90.
50
Pelers, '"Why We Fighl,"' 191.
46
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captured by the renegade national army, attributed the
dissolution of his fear to the white "powder to put in
our nose." 51 These accounts suggest that drug use
among child combatants spread to all factions, and
was employed for essentially the same purposes: to
inhibit aversion to killing; to soften responses to pain
and fatigue; and to manufacture bravery in the face of
fear. Moreover, it seems highly likely that many
children became addicted to one or more drugs while
fighting, which might have increased their loyalty to
the supplier of their drugs. Using drugs, commanders
simultaneously created more loyal and ruthless
fighters who were hardly aware of their actions and
fearless of death.
Diamonds
Not only did sales of diamonds allow the RUF/ SL to
continue and intensify the war despite a total lack of
popular support, they provided vast wealth to Taylor,
Sankoh, and any other interests willing to trade arms
for diamonds. 5 2 Though child soldier accounts about
diamonds are sparse, one combatant, James, reported
that "[t]hose who were abducted were forced to mine
diamonds and our bosses took ... the diamonds to the
Sierra Leone and Guinea border in exchange for
arms." 53 Japo described the role of outsiders in the
diamond trade; "Alimamy Balay came from Guinea and
51

52

Abdullah, '"Smallest Viclims,"' 250-1.
See Ian Smillie, Lansana Gberie, and Ralph Hazelton, The

Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human Security

(Ottawa: Partnership Africa Canada, 2000), <http://www.sierraleorw.org/ hea rlmatter . html >.
53
James Morseray, 281.
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bribed us to sell diamonds to him." 54 "We made
contacts with South Africans who gave us fuel and we
gave them diamonds," Japo continued, "Alimamy Baty,
Charles Taylor and Poto all sent representatives." 55
These events confirm connections between external
agents trading in diamonds and the supplies the
RUF/SL needed to continue its war. 56
Girls in Fighting Forces
Girls took part in the war on all sides. Many of
their roles involved sexual exploitation. Despite their
roles, the scale of involvement of female child soldiers
has been ignored by many post-conilict initiatives
aimed at demobilization and refritegration. Some
estimate nearly a quarter of the child combatants, and
nearly a third of the RUF /SL's child soldiers, were
female. Girl soldiers served in all capacities, as wives,
porters, and frontline fighlers. 57
54

Master Japo, 126.
Master Japo , 126. ln the same testimony, Japo also
confirms that all three individuals, and th e South Africans , were
actively supporting th e rebels.
56
Master Bowanag recalled another curious account of
diamonds. He relates how the "Red Cross were also coming there
Ito camp Zogoda l in their helicopter; they brought medicines and
ammunition for us and we, in turn, gave lhem diamonds,"
(Master Bowanag , 122, emphasis added). lt is difficult lo access
the accuracy of such a claim.
57
Using the term "wives" can be problematic; some refer lo
them as "bush wives" suggesting that they were not formalized
marriages. However, both connote a more formal sexual
relationship where a commander or male combatant is in some
capacity responsible fur his "wife." See Susan McKay and Dyan
Mazurana, Wh e re are the Girls?: Girls in Fighting Forces in
Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone ancl Mozambique: Their Lives
During and Ajler War, (Montreal: lnlernalional Centre for
55
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Central to the lives of all girl combatants were their
sexual experiences. The rampant commission of
sexual crimes has been documented by Human Rights
Watch. 58 Many girls were integrated into the fighting
community through the role of "bush wife." Serving as
commanders' and soldiers' wives, some girls exhibited
McKay's interviews
authority within the camps.
indicate that wives, in addition to their domestic
duties, were often trained in firearms, with many
fighting on the frontlines .5 9 Their integration into
command structures and family units was essential to
their everyday survival, since being a wife ensured
girls access to food and often protection. For instance,
Fatmata reported that the male RUF /SL soldier who
abducted, raped, and took her as his wife tried to
protect her from training and from other men who
might otherwise have raped her. 60 Alternatively,
McKay relates how sometimes "commanders' 'wives'
were replaced by more-favored girls . . . [with] the
rejected 'wives' . . . serving as front-line fighters." 61
Thus, favored wives could be protected from the most
dangerous jobs, whi le the remaining wives and girl
soldiers might be more vulnerable to dangerous
Human Rights and Democratic Development, 2004). For the
statistics on involvement see McKay page 92.
58
Human Rights Watch, Sierra Leone: "We'll Kill You if You
Cry": Sexual Violence in the Sierra Leone Conflict, (Human Rights
Watch Vol. 15, no. 1 (J\) January 2003).
59
McKay, Where are the Girls? 92-3.
6
° Fatmata Jalloh's testimony before the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, from Appendix: Three: Part Two,
Transcripts of Public Hearings Held in the District Headquarter
Towns, Closed Hearings Held in Makeni on 28 May 2003, 48 1-6.
She was thirteen at the time.
61
McKay, Where are the Girls? 94.
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combat.
Many girls, howev er, including those who eventually became wives, were raped repeatedly and by
Maria.ma related that after being
multiple men.
abducted, "we were raped ... [and] they inscribed RUF
on our bodies . . . we were distributed to different
rebels as wives. When we refused, they flogged us. We
were raped by two or three men daily ... We eventually got married to them." 6 2 Her testimony reveals the
sexually violent process through which she became a
wife. Fatu, abducted by the RUF /SL, reported being
raped violently and repeatedly during her captivity.
However, she was not trained and instead cooked for
the rebels. 63
Other armed groups also used girls. The CDF,
though it claimed otherwise, also deployed girls.
McKay addresses the Kamajors and the Gbethis who
employed girls in a variety of roles. 64 While some of
the girls fighting with CDF units had been integrated
through their husbands, a lready CDF soldiers, others
were forcibly recruited into the ranks. Catherine
recalled how "the RUF would sweep through villages
abducting many of the boys, the Kamajors would often
62
Mariama Mansaray's testimony before the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, from Appendix: Three: Part Two,
Transcripts of Public Hearings Held in the District Headquarter
Towns, Closed Hearings for in Koinadugu District, 4 May 2003,
385.
63
Falu Conteh's testimony before the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, from Appendix: Three: Part Two,
Transcripts of Public Hearings Held in the District Headquarter
Towns, Closed Hearings for in Koinadugu District, 4 May 2003,
396. She was ten when captured.
64
See McKay, Where are lhe Girls? 95-6, for- more
information about these roles.
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target the remaining girls." 65 Another example is a
RSLMF irregular who joined for revenge, and related
how rape could be a punishment, "[t]hey would rape
us if we retreated." 66 While some of the experiences of
girl combatants were similar to those of the boys,
others varied significantly. Many girls reported some
form of sexual violence, whether eventually normalized
through a bush marriage or not. 67
A Closer Look: A Long Way Gone
None of the interviews provide as detailed an
account of the war as Ishmael Beah. The war forced
Beah to flee the advancing rebels with a group of other
boys, facing danger as adults exhibited their fear of
"boys our age." 68 Beah fled for months and was
devastated when the rebels d e stroyed the village that
had been his family's refuge, killing his en lire family in
the process. After he witn esse d the death of his
family, he was coerced into joining the SLA by an army
commander who told them "They [the RUF/SL] have
lost everything that makes them human. They do not
deserve to live. That is why we must destroy every
single one of them." 69 Training began immediately,
and throughout the process his commander told them
to "Visualize the enemy, the rebels who killed your
parents, your family, and those who are responsible
65

McKay, Where are th e Girls? 97 .
Peters, '"Why We Fight,"' 192 .
67
Ofte n these relationship s res ul ted in chi ldre n, a nd in
some cases these "wives" re main ed with their husbands after the
war e nded .
68
Ishm ae l Beah, A Long Way Gone: Me moirs of a Boy Soldier,
(New York: Sarah Crichton Books, 2007 ), 37.
69
Beah, A Long Way Gone, 108.
66
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for everything that has happened to you." 70 Beah
learned how to operate, maintain, and fire his AK 47,
and he became inducted into a drug culture. He
began "sniffing brown brown, cocaine mixed with
gunpowder;" which gave him energy and numbed him,
making him a fierce fighter. 71
He reflected: "My squad was my family, my gun was
my provider and protector, and my rule was to kill or
be killed ... and it seemed as if my heart hadfrozen."12
The army became a surrogate family for him because
it was "slightly orgaJ.1ized," while fighting becaJ.ne his
normalized reality. 73 After two years of combat, Beah
was chosen for a UNICEF demobilization program.
Reflecting, he commented that "I was too drugged ..
to realize the danger." 74

Child Soldiers Reflect on Their Eirperiences and
Responsibility
Through a multipart process children were turned
into killers. Child combatants terrorized people using
amputations and rape.
When reflecting on their
actions, the children's words reveal three somewhat
divergent viewpoints: taking individual responsibility
for their actions; claiming a collective responsibility; or
70

Beah, A Long Way Gone, 112.
Beah, A Long Way Go ne, 121.
72
Beah, A Long Way Go n e, 126, emphasis added.
73
Ishmael Beah, book tour, Berkeley, California, February
23, 2007.
74
Beah, A Long Way Gone, 15 I. Despite, or perhaps because
of, his revelations Beah gradually regained his lost humanity. He
accomplished this through recognition of his actions, when he
began to trust people and to have co mpassion for them again.
Thus, leaving his drugged slate behind, he expressed his
humanity.
71
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expressing uncertainty about the result of their
actions.
Children from the different groups presented
statements about responsibility for death . Master
Japo accepted responsibility with a caveat: "I am not
denying that I kill[ed] ... but I never killed an innocent
person. 1f one asked me not to kill him or her, I would
ask that person to join the revolution." 7 5 Japo perhaps
reveals his indoctrination into the singular "morality"
of the cause promulgated by the RUF /SL. Additionally, two H.SLMF irregulars acknowledged their actions
which included killing people. 76 Momoh, renegade
national army, admitted responsibility for his actions,
stating that he "killed many people," but "I pray to God
for forgiveness." 77 In contrast, others reported their
actions in somewhat vague co llective first person
statements that did not explicitly recognize their
individual responsibility. For instance, Patrick began
several statements with "[w]e killed." 78 Anthony also
described that "We now killed . . ." 79 His phrasing
suggests a sense of group, rather than personal,
agency . Master Rokono, 6 years old when abducted,
acknowledged both group and personal responsibility
for killing. 8 n Despite the contrast between the "I" and

I

75

Master Japo, 126, emphasis added .
See Peters, "'Why We f7ighl,"' 19 I and 195.
77
Abdullah, "'Smallest Viclims,"' 250.
78
Master Patrick Bangura, 750.
79
Anthony Andrew Tollo, 776.
80
Master Rokono's testimony before the Trulh and
Reconciliation Comm ission, from Appendix Three: Parl Two,
Transcripts of Public Hearings He ld in Lhe District Headquarter
Towns, Afternoon Session of Closed Hearing Held in Bo on l
May 2003, 113 and 115.
76
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"we" stalements, it cannol be cerlain lhat collective
stalements connote a complete denial of personal
responsibility, although the plural usage does remove
individual agency.
Perhaps the mosl fascinaling of lhe calegories of
responsibility are tho se who are unsure whelher they
killed or not. Falma la , for example, claimed that "I
cannot tell you lhat I have ever killed somebody facially;" at the same lime, she stated that she "must
accept that I killed." 8 1 Fudie also expressed uncerlainty, stating that "There were times when you were
retreating and shooting at lhe same time, and you
would have killed without knowing." 82 While Fudie's
statement suggests that he might have killed during
combat, he also blamed confusion on the battlefield for
making his aclions indefinile. A lcamajor concurs: "I
am not sure if I have killed s omebody .... [M]ay be you
are pointing at one man a nd your neighbor a lso [is
aiming] at the same man ... [bjut you will not be able
to identify [which ones you killed] because lher e were
many in the action ."83 Des pile lheir words, it is likely
that these individuals killed. This distancing mechanism might also h a ve made lheir r e inlegration into
society easier.
When reflecting on their lives as soldiers, some
children expressed a fondness for soldiering. One
child who foughl wilh RSLMF slate d lhat he enjoyed
being near his bro th e r, also a soldier, and lha t he
"liked the soldier work." 84 Another RSLMF irregular
81

82
83
84

Fatmata Jalloh, 2 9 8.
Fu<lie Swa .rray, 285 .
Pe te rs, "'Why We Fig ltl, "' l 98 .
Pe te rs , '"Why We Fighl, .,, 2 0 2.
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reported that he "liked to be free in the country[side],"
and that he "loved the work" of "saving life and property. " 85 The second also believed he was fighting to
defend the land against the rebels. 8 6 A third RSLMF
irregular reflected on his experience: "l liked it in the
army because we could do anything we liked to do ....
I was free." 87 This young combatant's statement
chillingly elucidates his enjoyment of the soldier life
due to the power he exercised over adult civilians.
Japo expressed that "l was then I big man in the
jungle."8 8 Japo considered himself an adult, since his
position with the RUF/SL as a commander gave him
the power he ordinarily lacked as a child in Sierra
Leone society.
The TRC transcripts also offered a venue for these
children to seek forgiveness from their fellow Sierra
Leoneans. Alex provided an elaborate statement that
epitomizes these sentiments:
I am saying to my people and the entire country
that I was under pressure when I committed all
those atrocities ... . Please forgive me for whatever wrong I have done and I have come today
asking you to embrace me as there is no evil
forest to throw away wicked children ... Please
forgive me and embrace me. 89
Alex named the rebels as responsible for his actions
and those of his fellow child soldiers. Moreover, his
85

86
87

88
89

Peters, "'Why We Fight,"' 190.
Peters, '"Why We Fight,"' 189 .
Peters, '"Why We Fight ,"' 19 4.
Maste r Japo, 125.
Alex Jusu Allie u , 295.
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words reveal the difficulties that children, particularly,
faced as ex-combatants when attempting reintegration
into their communities after the war officially ended.
Conclusion
The RUF /SL invasion of Freetown in January 1999
was a watershed for the entire conflict. After two
weeks of continuing violence, CDF units and ECOMOG
forces were able to push the rebels out of Freetown.
Widely publicized accounts of Freetown atrocities
focused vital international attention on the wa.r. 90 The
prominent role of child soldiers in Freetown verified
the RUF/SL's successful use of children as fighters,
manipulated by a cullure of violence and drugs. 91
Furthermore, the attack on Freetown confirms the
experiences of child combatants whose stories have
been told here. Despite similarities between experiences, significant and important discrepancies exist
among the realities of child soldiers fighting both
within and beyond different groups. Most soldiers
were the products of indoctrination, training, and drug
addiction. Moreover, their extreme youth conditioned
their lack of a sense of individual responsibility; many
former child soldiers deny individual culpability for
violence . Because of these factors, the role of their
agency in perpetrating these violent and horrific acts
is complex. After handing over their weapons lo UN
peacekeepers, child soldiers entered Disarmament,
90

Ullimalely, lhis allenlion facililated Lhe crealion of
UNAMSlL lo enforce the Lome Accord, signed in the monlhs
afler lhe invasion.
qi Gbe rie, A Dirly War, 151.
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Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs. 92
Moreover, it remains to be seen how the legacy of
these child combatants will affect the future of Sierra
Leone. However, the recovery of Sierra Leone from this
violent period does not only involve dealing with child
combatants, but with communities responsible for
reintegrating former fighters into their villages. Also,
cultural and religious traditions need to be
considered. 93 Hopefully, processes at the level of
national justice will also aid in the reconciliation of the
entire country. 94 Despite lhe possibility for closure
and healing, the RUF/ SL's trademark tactic of terror
will ensure that the war and its victims will not be
forgotten. While it might be possible for child soldiers
to be rehabilitated and reintegrated, this process
cannot heal the permanent scar and loss of limbs
suffered by lh e amputees.
For decades Sierra
Leoneans will have a visual reminder of the bloody and
violent war.
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For more detailed inform ation on m any of these issues
and chalJenges see Michael Wessells and Davidson Jonah,
"Recruitment and Reintegration of Former Youth Soldiers in
Sierra Leone: Challenges of Reconciliation a nd Post-Accord
Peace Building," from Trou.blemalcers or Peacemakers?: You.th
and Post-Accord Peace Bu.ilding, Siobhan McEvoy-Levy, ed.
(Notre Dame, In.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006).
However, many obstacles hindered this process, including
poverty, lack of educational and employment opportunities, and
drug addiction.
93
These points were also touched on by Beah at the talk in
Berkeley.
94
The Special Court for Sierra Leone was set up to facilitate
the justice aspect; for more inJormat ion about the Special Court
see Gberie's A Dirty War.
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Re-Evaluation of Self: An Exan1ination
of the Political and Personal Outlooks of
White A1nerica and Japanese-Americans
on the Post-World War II Era
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Melissa Johnson
The United Slates Government awarded Lhe 442 nd
Battalion with 9,486 Purple Hearts, 4,000 Bronze
Stars, and 560 Silver Stars due to their heroism in the
European Theater during World War 11. 1 Despite the
loyalty and bravery these soldiers demonstrated during
the war, adversity and suspicion greeted them back
home. The American population's reaction forced
them into a silence that in many ways led lo their
invisibility over the years. Why did this happen? The
simple answer is racial prejudice since the unit's
members were second-generation (Nisei) Japauese
American soldiers. In light of Lhe war in the Pacific,
prejudice does not seem like a stretch of the imagination. However, Anti-J apanese feelings did not begin
with the war, but rather in 1851, when the first
Japanese arrived along with West Coast. 2 To the
Japanese population, Anti-Asian sentiment meant that
their post-war integration was not a simple re-acceptance or re-entry into American society; instead
integration created a need for all Japanese lo reevaluate their ethnic and cultural identities. Ethnic
1
Edwin Nakasone, The Nisei So ldier, (While Bear Lake, MN :
J -Press, 1999), 4 4-45.
2
Raymond Buell, "The Develop111 e nt of the Anti-Japanese
/\gilalion in the United Stales," PoliLicul Science Quarlerly , 37
(Dec., 1922), 605 .
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re-evaluation signified the complete submergence of
Japanese culture and a complete acceptance of an
American ideology.
Unhealthy Japanese-American and white-American
relations at the end of World War 11 coerced the Japanese to re-evaluate their ethnic identity. JapaneseAmericans realized that their physical appearance
reminded the United States of the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor and the war in the Pacific .
The
Japanese-Americans opted, therefore, to culturally and
socially blend into middle-class, white America. In
effect, the Japanese asked America to accept them
under the condition that they would not perpetuate a
Japanese-ness. America asked the Japanese not to
remind them of their ethnic Japanese and cultural
identity, and offered national acceptance in return.
The story of the 442 nd presented an archetype for
Japanese integration. The Japanese population's lack
of acceptance during the war led many Nisei to voluntarily sign up for the 442 nd in order to prove Japanese
loyalty to the United States. Loyalty expressed the
Japanese's internal need to fit in. A second outward
expression was presented when the soldiers returned
home and attempted to find white-collar work that
would launch them into the middle-class, instead of
returning to their previous service-based jobs. The
Nisei's success in their occupational endeavors made
it seem like they had appropriately assimil ated and
America stopped talking about the Japanese presence.
However, not discussing the situation led to a complele silence about the Japanese post-war era.
Discourse about this silent period has begun only
recently, in large part because of the Sansei. These
third generation Japanese-Americans started examin-
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ing their parents' era and brought information about
the post-war period to light. Scholars had previously
discussed the anti-Asian sentiment in the United
States, as well as the roles that the Japanese played
during the War. However, anti-Asian thought as a
precursor to Japanese treatment in subsequent years
has never been closely examined. Investigation of
early anti-Asian sentiment through the post-war
period shows that the seamless integration of the
Japanese into American society was not as innocent as
usually presented. Understanding the lack of innocence in Japanese integration in no way disputes the
reality of that integration, but provides reasoning for
why it appeared faultless. The Japanese-Americans
actively smoothed over or ignored transitional difficulties . Ignoring those difficulties highlights the fact that
Japanese re-entry into white-America dealt with how
well Japanese-Americans functioned in society, not
that the American majority forgot their anti-Japanese
transgressions. Seamless entry originated in the
Japanese-Americans' willingness to conceal their
presence in America which created the subsequent
silence that the Sansei would eventually uncover.
A short history of the Japanese presence in America helps to underscore the Japanese reluctance to call
attention to themselves after the War.
Japanese
immigrants had a relatively short existence within
America. Despite that small time frame, in the eyes of
Californians, the Japanese had worn out their welcome. Bias against the Japanese primarily began as
an economically based problem as while Californians
believed that they were forced out of service-based jobs
due to the influx of Asian immigrants. America had
just recently passed the Chinese Exclusion Act which
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denied immigration of the Chinese into America for the
same economic reasons. Naturally, then, the increase
of the Japanese population escalated anti-Asian
sentiments. 3
Industry was not the only sector of society in which
the Japanese were excluded - they also felt the push
from San Francisco school districts. The people of San
Francisco unsuccessfully advocated a segregated
school system, mimicking the "separate but equal"
ideas in other parts of the country. 4 Anti-Asian
feelings ran so high that when politicians campaigned
for public office many of their platforms dealt with
getting rid of the Japanese problem in the United
States, with campaign slogans such as "Swat the
Jap."s
Racial tensions primarily took root on the West
Coast, where Japanese immigration was more prevalent. However, the West's feelings must not be mistaken as the sentiment for the rest of the country. In
fact, when California petitioned for a bill to eliminate
Japanese immigration, Theodore Roosevelt was quoted
as saying "Didn't you know such a thing was preposterous?" and later added "l would veto it if it were passed
unanimously." 6 The President's remarks show the
regional nature of Anti-Asian thought. Regionalism is
important to understand not only for the treatment of
3

Ibid., 605-608; Maisie Conrat, Executive Order 9066: The
Internment of 110,000 Japanese Ame ricans, (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press for the California Historical Society, 1972), 16.
4
Ibid., 19-20.
5
Roger Daniels, The Politics of Prejtidice: The Anti-Japanese
Movement in California and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion,
(New York: Atheneum, 1969), 97.
0
Buell, Political Science Quarte rly, 1922, 618 -619.
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the Japanese during the war, but especially after because where else would Nisei return but the West
where they had grown up?
The attack on Pearl Harbor seemed to confirm the
stereotype that the Japanese were "sneaky" and "unscrupulous."7 As a result, Pearl Harbor was the
catalyst of the infamous Executive Order 9066 that
instructed the Japanese to move out of the military
zones and into relocation centers. However, a grave
misconception surrounds the Order. While it did lead
to the evacuation of over 110,000 Japanese people, the
Executive Order itself never directly mentioned Japanese people. The Order instead gave the West Coast
the military power to do whatever they saw fit to
protect the war zone from enemy invasion. 8 Of course,
effectively the Order le t people on the West Coast make
a decision about a group of people who had a striking
resemblance to those who attacked Pearl Harbor, and
whom the West had looked down upon for decades.
Mounting racial tensions fell heavily on the Nisei.
White-Americans doubted the Nisei's loyalty not only
due to their physical attributes, but also because of
their ties to Japan. The lssei (first generation immigrants) customarily registered their children's birth in
Japan, even if the children were born in the United
States and were U.S. citizens by birth right. The
7

Jacobus tenBroek, et. aJ., Prejudice, War, and the
Constitution, (Berkeley : University of California press, 1954), 27,
315, 329.
8
Louise Fiset, "Redress For Nisei Public Employees in
Washington State after World War fl," Pacific Northwest
Quarterly 1996-1997 88 (1) : 23; "Executive Order 9066,"
Japanese American internet Curriculum, 14 October 2006
<http://bss.sfsu.edu/ internment/ executiorderYU66.html>.
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resulting dual citizenship led Americans to believe that
Nisei loyalty actually rested with Japan. 9 American
citizenship simply was not enough to dislodge the
growing fear of the Japanese, so the Executive Order
was not contested by the American majority, despite
its obvious implications.
The Japanese were also unable to do anything in
response to Executive Order 9066 or to assuage the
fears about their loyalty to the American population.
If Japanese people spoke out they would be seen as
disloyal to the United States; additionally, they physically could do nothing, since they lacked political
power. The Government denied the lssei citizenship
until 1952 and with it the right to vote. The majority
of Nisei children were usually too young. 10 The only
option for the Japanese was to prove their loyalty in
another way.
Creating an all-Japanese battalion caused some
reluctance since the Japanese were specifically not
drafted at the onset of the War, due to suspicion of
espionage and disloyalty. 11 When President Franklin
Roosevelt was asked about the 442 nd 's formation he

9
Umezawa Duus, Unlikely liberators, 46; Donna K. Nagata,
"The Japanese-American Internment: Perceptions of Moral
Community, Fairness, and Redress," in Journal of Social Issues,
46 (1990), 135.
0
'
Ibid.
11
"Army Opens Ranks to Japanese Units," New York Times.
29 January 1943 p. 9; The Pacific War and Peace: Americans of
Japanese Ancestry in Military Intelligence Service 1941-1952,
(San Francisco: Military Intelligence Service Association of
Northern California and the National Japanese American
Historical Society, 1991), 13; United Japanese Society of Hawaii,
A Hist01"Y of Japanese in Hawaii, (Honolulu: The Society, 1971),
268.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2008

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

37

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

al Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II, Vol. 13 [2008

Re-Evalualion of Self

33

said, "No loyal citizen of the United States should be
denied the democratic right lo exercise the responsibilities of his citizenship, regardless of his ancestry." 12
Roosevelt's commenls presented an overly idealized
version of the situalion for the Nisei soldiers. The
Nisei were not selected to fight as Americans, but as
more soldiers for the American cause. When the army
called for volunteers from the relocation centers a
great majority of the Nisei signed up to not only fight
for their country, bul to prove their loyalty to the
American people in a Lime and silualion when everyone believed the opposite. Opposition to lhe Japanese
prompted the 442 nd 's motto "Go for Broke." They fully
intended to risk everything because they believed lhat
anything less would prove to America that lhey were
not loyal. One Nisei soldier sums up his and other
men's situalion perfeclly: "We're fighting two wars.
One for American democracy, and one against the
prejudice toward us in America." 13 Thus it became
imperalive Lhat lhe Nisei fight lo redeem lheir family
and friends at home. The Nisei believed lhat if they
lost battles or jeopardized the war effort they would
also lose the trust thal had been put in lhem by their
fellow Japanese lo prove their uni led loyalty. 14
The army was ve1y aware of how the recruiting
process of the 442 nd looked lo lhe Japanese population-body replacemenls for lhe fallen members of the
Orville Cresap Shirey, Americans: The Story of lite 442 nd
Combat Team, (Washington D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1946),
19.
13
Umezawa Duus, Urili/cely Liberators, 44
14
Conrad R. Stein, Nisei Re_qimenl, (Chicago: Childrens
Press, 1985), 17.
12
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100 th Battalion (a Japanese unit from Hawaii). 15
Despite this, the army did not really mask the fact that
they had no idea where to place the Combat Team in
relation to other platoons. As a result, the 442 nd was
considered the "bastard battalion" that did not really
fit anywhere in the military. The army saw the battalion as a "guinea pig battalion" and "bullet shields" for
the real army. 16 These stigmas from within the army
only helped to fuel outside disregard for the Japanese
community.
The mentality of the army influenced the newspaper coverage of the 442 nd as newspapers depended on
what information the military released. The army's
reluctance to circulate news resulted from their fear
that the Nisei soldiers would be viewed as what they
were, "cannon fodder," due to the countless numbers
of Nisei soldiers killed on the battlefield. The army
instead tried to promote an image of the Nisei as
"willing martyrs" for the American cause in Europe.
Yet the army also wanted to downplay how large of a
role the 442 nd had in the war effort. When large battles
took place, and the U.S. military was able to gain
ground, white soldiers were the ones pictured in the
newspapers back home - not the 442 nd members from
the front lines. 17
The army could not place the 442 nd in a particular
platoon, wanted new recruits, but could not promote
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lbid., 23-24, 152-153; Karleen Chinen, et. aJ., Japanese
Eyes ... American Heart, (Honolulu: Tenclai Educational
Foundation, 1998), 4.
17
Patricia Curtin. "Press Coverage of the 442 nd Regimental
Combat Team (Separate-Nisei): A Case Study in Agenda
Building," in American Journalism 12 (3, 1995), 231.
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the fact that the Japanese would be thrown in the
front lines, and also did not want 442 nd heroics pictured in the paper. The indecisiveness of the army to
ma.lee a firm stance on their position about the 442 nd ,
only reiterates how America did not know what to do
with the Japanese .
Despite the military's control of what was released
about the 442"\ East Coast papers lauded their
military successes. Since lhe 442 nd was doing so well
it was impossible to write negatively about them, so
West Coast (who still held a regional vehemence)
newspapers printed nothing at all. 18 The West Coast
went to outstanding lengths Lo downplay the success
stories of the 442 nd • They often ran side-by-side
stories of the 442 nd 's formation and the battles America
was fighting against the Japanese in the Pacific, to
detract from the 442"ct 's military achievements. 19 J\ll
press coverage - in whatever form it took - stopped
completely after the deactivation of the 442"ct .20 It was
not until recent Limes that public interest pushed the
facts about the relocation era and the concerned
parties back into the news.
ln turn, the way the newspaper coverage played
out, meant that on the West Coast people still refused
to acknowledge the 442 n d or were unaware of its
formation and what it accomplished. The lack of
communication led to problems for lhe Nisei when
they returned home as well as for their older lssei
parents, recently released from the relocation centers.
The discrepancies in n ewspaper reporting stopped lhe
18
19

20

Ibid., 23 0- 2 31.
Ibid., 2 2 6- 23 4.
!bit.I., 239 .
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blending process of ethnic Japanese culture and
American societal values.
The return of the Nisei soldiers cannot be viewed as
one cohesive transition, but instead should be differentiated based on their living situations on both the East
and West Coasts of America. An in-depth study of the
East Coast is unnecessary primarily because there
were only a small number of Japanese from that
region, but also because negative public sentiment
toward them during the War was negligible. 21 The
Japanese who trained for combat in the East and
South shared an easy relationship with the town
locals. Due to this relationship, the Japanese returning to the East Coast and surrounding areas had a
relatively simple transition back into white-society. 22
The same thing can not be said for West Coast settlers.
The Japanese who returned to California and other
Western states faced the same type of anti-Asian
sentiment that they knew from their pre-war experience; which means that one must break down the
discussion of Japanese West Coast settlers even
further.
Exclusion and disdain greeted the majority of the
Nisei soldiers who returned home on the West Coast.
Many of the soldiers could not rent apartments or
houses, were not allowed to patronize restaurants, and
the states that housed internment centers did not
want the Japanese to remain or return there. The
West's general ideology stated that it was up to the
21

Umezawa Duus, Unlikely Liberalors, 141.

22

Stein, Nisei Regiment, 22.
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Nisei to fix their own problems, social or economic. 23
In defending their positions against the Japanese, and
specifically the 442 n d , some Americans slated that the
442 nd soldiers fough t so well in the War because they
had enjoyed killing whites and that their true loyalty
belonged to the Japanese Emperor. 24 Public consciousness, which basically called the Japanese
"white-murderers," clearly showed the difference
between the lsseis and Niseis' status between the two
coastlines. The importance of the East and West
dichotomy, however, does not overshadow how those
anti-Japanese feelings significantly affected individual
Japanese people.
Regionalism only addresses the Japanese situation
on the surface. A deeper level of examining post-war
re-entrance into American society must be viewed in
two distinct ways: the external and the internal. The
external level deals with the outside pressure ofwhiteAmerica silently asking the Japanese not to remind
them of their inherent Japanese qualities. The internal level is then, the inward expression of how the
Japanese responded to those outside pressures and
molded themselves in a way that would best fit into the
American majority. As the Japanese were obviously
physically recognizable, visually blending into American society after the War was not an option. Instead,
they began a process of adopting American culture and
values. Japanese citizens sought out "clean work" to
23

Thelma Chang, I Call Never Forget: Men of lhe
100°'/442"d. (Honolulu, HI: Sigi Productions, 1991), 188;
Umezawa Duus, Unlikely Liberators, 146; J e re Taka hashi, NiseiSansei: Shifting Japanese A rn ericon. lde nlilies a1td Politics.
(Philade lphia: Templeton U. Pr., 1997), 114 and J 22.
24
Chang, J Can Never Forget, 190.
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aid their transition. They looked for white-collar jobs
or college educated positions to boost the Japanese
social status into a middle-class setting. Japanese
people were able to do this by virtue of the fact that,
unlike African Americans at this time, segregation laws
did not push them out of the education system. The
ability to enter higher-levels of schooling meant the
Japanese had a springboard to attain that middle class
notoriety. 25
The Japanese post-war transition seemed so
innocent as they easily slipped into the education
system- meaning of course, that no one thought there
were problems to discuss. In fact, the Japanese were
not aware that their experiences during the war,
whether it was through military service or the camps,
were something they could talk about. Now, of course,
there are multiple documentaries, stories, and lessons,
but no one talked about the situation of the Japanese
in the late 1940s. One Nisei girl recounts how her
father was in a separate camp than she and her family
and was unable to write to them, not because he
lacked permission, but because there was no way to
express the situation at hand. 2 c,
The inabilities for the Japanese to express themselves only worsened once the Nisei returned home or
were released from the relocation camps. They felt
unsure of their place within the larger American
context or even within their own communities. As a
result, the Japanese were compelled to "make do."

I
I
I

I
I

I
I
I

I
I

I

25

Takahashi, Nisei/Sansei, 118,121,122.
Caroline Chung Simpson, An Absent Presence: Japanese
Americans in Poslwar ATllericun Cu.llure,
1945 1900, (Durham,
NC: Duke University Press, 2001), 28.
26

Published by Scholar Commons, 2008

I
43

I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

al Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II, Vol. 13 [2008

Re-Eva luation of Self

I.
I

39

Such a compulsion u rged Lhe Nisei to submerge their
ethnic and racial iden tity under that of the American
culture. 27 The Nisei h a d learned through their experiences during the wa r th a t their Ame rican loyalty was
necessary for survival. ln turn, they embraced the
middle-class ideology a nd became as American as they
possibly could. 28 Th e fact that the Sansei did not
question their parents ' participation in World War 11 for
so long exemplifies Lhe effectiveness of Japanese
integration into middle-class America. 29
The story or Tokyo Rose (Lhe American G.l. term
created to describe any one of the female, Englishspeaking, Japanese propaganda radio broadcasters
during the War) provides a case in point of the exte rnal
pressures that the Japanese fa ced.
lva Toguri
D'Aquino was an American citizen who wa s taking care
of her aunt in Japan when Pearl Harbor was attacked,
and as a result was una ble to return home.
D'Aquino 's eventual deslitule status forced her into
broadcasting propaga nda for Japan and she was
therefore considered a traitor to her American citizenship. Once she returned home, the U.S. Government
denied D'Aquino 's citizen s hip rights and placed her in
prison. Everyone in America and Japan knew that
there was no singular Tokyo Rose a nd, even more so,
that D'Aquino was not guilty of treason .30
D'Aquino's situation is important because the Nisei
community did nothing to help her. The Nisei's refusal
to step in and lend support r eveals their reluctance to
27
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disturb their newly acquired Japanese American
identity. 3 1 The Nisei's lack of response to the D'Aquino
situation was not just individual; but also that of
associated groups. The JACL (Japanese American
Citizens League) also refused to confront the Tokyo
Rose case and isolated the community from the entire
issue. The JACL was afraid to shine any light back
onto Japanese Americans, good or bad. 32 In the minds
of the Nisei on the West Coast, it was time for them to
get out of the limelight, and their attempt to find a way
to blend into American life without controversy was in
the forefront of their minds.
As a result, blending became the process by which
the lssei and Nisei integrated into American society.
The integration was seen as innocent. Yet that "innocent" re-entry came at the price of self identity. A
complete submergence of Japanese culture and ethnic
identity had to occur before white middle-class America accepted them.
Since the Japanese's earliest arrival, American
society looked down upon their population and saw
them as nothing but a labor class who competed with
white Americans for positions in the service industry,
and eventually as spies whose true alliance belonged
to the Japanese Emperor. All of these ideologies
melded into one ethnic, Oriental stereotype. The
attack on Pearl Harbor confirmed the treachery and
sneakiness the greater population attributed to Asians,
and rumors about enemy spy rings flourished. The
West Coast's lingering refusal to accept the Japanese
as American citizens encapsulated fear of the Orient
31

32

Ibid. 139 and Simpson, An Absent Presence, 84.
Ibid., 101 and 103 .
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and caused the internment of the Japanese in ten
relocation centers in states with a West Coast bias.
Finally, when the Nisei were called upon to fight for
their country in a battle that was not only meant to
show American democracy but also prove their loyalty,
the 442 c.1 Regimental Combat Team was formed. The
442 nd soldiers fought with a vigor that belied their
country's lack of faith and trust in their capabilities.
The 442 nd proved lo the entire world what side of the
War in which they fought. However, the sporadic news
coverage in the East and the less than truthful coverage in the West did nothing to abate loyalty fears.
When the lsseis and Niseis returned home, (primarily
in the West) people were only marginally aware of what
the 442 nd accomplished, and most of that information
was skewed, causing the internalization and re-evaluation of what the Japanese had to outwardly perpetuate
in order to find acceptance with the American populace.
As it turned out, the Japanese were still the pariah
of the American continent. They had to hide half, if
not all, of who they were and immerse themselves in
while cult ure so as to no longer be called traitors.
These internal transformations caused them to ignore
D'Aquino's plight, all in the name of not drawing
unneeded attention to themselves. lt was not until a
generation later, when the Sansei began to question
this uncharacteristic hush period within American
society, that Japanese participation in the War resurfaced. Through this movement, the Sansei were able
to uncover not only their lost ethnic heritage but also
uncover the plighl lheir parents and grandparents
experienced during the height of the War and subsequent aftermath. The Sansei discovered one of Amer11
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ica's most controversial periods, due to not only the
politics involved, but also because of the silence that
it was drowned in. Once the racial lines were drawn,
it was difficult to erase, especially with the lack of
communication between all parties. The culmination
of over a century's worth of conflict led to the phenomenon in which the Japanese re-integration into middleclass America became one of re-evaluation and redefinition instead of the comp lete acceptance they had
fought for during the War.
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Drug Abuse in Vietnam:
The
Underappreciated Casualty of War
Brigid S. Kelleher
On 19 March 2003, the United States, along with
British forces, entered inlo "Operation Iraqi Freedom,"
overthrowing Iraqi president Saddam Hussein. Also
known as the Second Gulf War, this conflict sent
American and British troops inlo Iraq to disarm the
nation's weapons of mass destruction (W.MDs).
Though existence of WMDs within Iraq was never
proven, men and women from all service branches
were sent to combat Al-Qaeda and Hussein loyalists.
Hoslilily remains intense as first-hand accounts
describe improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and car
bombs, violent raids and hostage situations. In
February 2005 the Drug and Food Administration of
America sanctioned lhe dislribulion of ecstasy (containing 125 mg of the active ingredient
methylenedioxymelhamphelamine or MDMA) to
veterans of the Iraqi conflict in order lo combat post
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 1 Deployed soldiers
suffering from stress are also commonly given antidepressants and sleeping aids as means to heal their
psyches and are returned lo duly, while drugs available over the counter in Iraq, such as Valium, are
increasingly abused by civilians and soldiers alike .2
1
David Adam, "E:cslasy Trials for Combat Stress," The
Guardian, 17 Feb. 2005 <hllp://linyurl.com/5rasn> (28 Jan.

2007).
2

Baghdad Burning, "Of Valium , Drugs & Iraq ." Towards a

Counter Movement, 13 Ocl. 2004 <http://linyurl.com/ytluvo>

(28 Jan. 2007).
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The chaos in Iraq has opened a new route for Afghan
heroin and other opiates, and marijuana and amphetamines have been confiscated at the Jordanian
border. 3
The situation in Iraq is not the first major American
armed conflict to give rise to increased illicit drug use.
While rumors loom about illicit drug use and the
huffing of inhalants by American soldiers, evidence
reveals a consistent increase in drug abuse by American soldiers during wartime. The Vietnamese conflict,
which engaged American troops from 1961 until the
Paris Peace Accords in 1973, immersed young soldiers
into the Golden Triangle, a region covering Myanmar
(Burma), Thailand, Laos and Vietnam and infamous
for opium production. Heroin was readily available to
American soldiers of all ranks. 4 Marijuana was also
easily accessible, often used as an antidote to fear and
openly smoked by patients within Veteran Administrations (VA) hospitals. 5 This crusade against Communism within Vietnam saw local peoples and Americans
push heroin and marijuana within the country, and
saw the rise of its availability stateside as well. American soldiers who became increasingly dependent on
illicit drugs while deployed in Vietnam returned to the
cultural revolution of the 60s and 70s as addicts,
increasing drug abuse within the United States. In
such a way, the war in Vietnam had a profound impact
on the accessibility and trends of drug use by Ameri-
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J Aqeel Hussein & Colin Freeman, "Heroin Tracie Thrives on
Back of Chaos & Terror in Iraq," Telegraph, 9 Apr. 2005
<http :/ /tinyurl.com/9e5u4> (28 Jan. 2007).
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VH 1 Rocle Ones: The 0mg Years, prod. VH I & The
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cans, providing a tragic example of a too-frequently
minimized by-produc t of war, which needs careful
examination in view of its possible implications in the
current conflict in Iraq.
Scholars have explored drug abuse in Vietnam, but
do not reflect the alarming pattern within U.S . history.
Alfred W. McCoy spoke correctly in The Politics of
Heroin in Southeast Asia when he meticulously investigated heroin trafficking within the Golden Triangle and
surrounding regions and predicted a "generation of
junkies" back in 1972 .6 But his words of warning were
not heeded and even he could not foresee exactly what
lay ahead. Instead the problem of drug addiction
within the military expanded dramatically. McCoy
outlined the systematic corruption of the South
Vietnamese government and its direct connections to
drug abuse by i\merican military in Vietnam and
increased drug trafficking of hard drugs to the United
States . McCoy's expose, constituting only one chapter
in his book, does not Louch upon the drug abuse
resulting from the Vietnam War as a pattern because
it was written even before the Paris Peace Accords. In
Mailers of Substance: Drugs- and Why Everyone's a
User (2004), Griffith Edwards allempls lo explain drug
abuse by soldiers in Vietnam, but falls short. Despite
his recent publication date, Edwards does not try to
link war and increasing drug abuse by Americans in
his explanation of Why Everyone's a User. He paints
the Vietnam War as an unclear factor, almost a mystery with many facts yet to be discovered . Edwards
often claims that important information which could
6
Alfred W. McCoy, Tile Politics of l-ie roi1t i1t Southe a s t A s ia
(New York: Harpe r & Row, 19 7 2), 222 .
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make such links does not exist, but other sources
prove him wrong. Edwards works only with information on the surface. He takes at face value, for example, the fact that a low percentage of soldiers did not
pass their urinalysis, rather than digging deeper into
possible explanations for this apparent anomaly. This
paper will take a more critical approach, which includes developing the role of geography in making
illicit drug use so easy, as well as the role that an
unpopular war played in making it so prevalent among
American troops.
America before the Vietnam War was not a nation
consumed with drug policies and rehabilitation clinics .
With the Allies' victory ending World War II, American
soldiers returned home as heroes to a booming economy, producing collegians, scholars, and a new affluent middle class. The 1950s and early 1960s are
characterized by suburbia and June Cleaver, baby
boomers and the British invasion of rock 'n roll. Even
as sparks ignited the names of the civil rights and
women's movements, no one could predict or comprehend a nation afflicted with a growing number of sons
and daughters who both used and pushed illicit drugs.
To call this a drug-free period, however, would be a
gross mistake. As the nation moved into the psychedelic 60s and 70s, experimental use of hallucinogens
and marijuana by the nation's youth ran rampant.
Yet, addiction, especially within white middle-class
homes, was unthinkable. Most considered illegal
dn1gs to be a plague on the black ghettoes and other
more urban areas with higher crime rates. The mafia
(professionals at organized crime) was understood to
be the main distributor of what few illicit drugs existed
in America, rendering the idea that a suburban-bred
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son could orchestrate an elaborate drug deal out of the
question.
Although there is no doubt that illegal drug use
already existed in America in the early years of the war
in Vietnam, more potent and greater quantities of
narcotics were found outside of the nation's borders.
In 1964 an increase in troops was sent directly to the
world's premier producer of raw opium: the Golden
Spanning across four countries within
Triangle.
Southeast Asia, the Golden Triangle affects many
more. A vast majority of the poppies grown to cultivate
opiates are produced in the northeast of modern day
Myanmar. Sometimes motorized vehicles carry the
narcotics, but more often mules are used as transport.
Raw opium is shuttled from the Shan hills on unpaved
mule trails to Bangkok. fi'rom there opium enters
international markets, seeing most exports lo Hong
Kong. Other routes are taken, however, as the opiates
are smuggled across national borders by air. Flights
generally depart from northern Laos and land at the
international airport in Saigon (present day Ho Chi
Minh City). While Hong Kong remains the most
important center for international trafficking of heroin
and opium, Saigon is the "major transshipment point
for Golden Triangle narcotics heading for Europe and
the United States." 7 Often en route or after the completion of a shipment, opium is taken to refineries lo
be processed into heroin, a product of much smaller
volume than raw opium, and therefore easier to
transport.
Opium transportation was so easy, though slowed
by terrain, for two prominent reasons: culture and
7

Ibid., 152-3.
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politics. In most Southeast Asian countries, smoking
opium is legal. For years China supplied the United
Kingdom with its opium. When exporting the product
grew out of control, China had to plead with Queen
Vicloria to discontinue processing the narcotic. Within
the Golden Triangle opium dens, similar to present day
hookah bars, riddled the streets. By the time American troops landed in South Vietnam many opium dens
were closed, but smoking opium remained a widely
accepted recreational practice. To say that only "some
elderly Vietnamese" still used opium and heroin at the
time of the conflict, a position held by Iver Peterson, is
a terrible mistake. The availability of narcotics in the
region was high, and cultural trends did not discourage its use. 8
Corruption is the premier word to describe Vietnamese politics during the time of the conflict. As the
French who had colonized Vietnam understood, the
highest ranks of government were plagued by selfgratification and decadence. Western thought had
rocked Southeast Asia's leadership values and ideals.
Technology, revolution, and oppression had "released
dynamic forces of social change."9 Leaders in these
societies combined excess materialism with selfishness. Systematic corruption was the result. For many
of these nations, despotic rulers living in lavish palaces became the norm . Civilians were taught that
meritocratic sovereigns deserved their indulgences,
that kings were gods. As the United States filled the

I
I
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8
Iver Peterson, "Deaths from Drug J\buse Rise among
Vietnam Gls," 'J'he New York 'J'irnes, 3 l Oct. 1970, ProQuest
Historical Newspapers, 3.
0
McCoy, The Politics of Heroin , LS7 .
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power vacuum left by the French, American officials
did not heed their predecessors' warnings of the
dangers posed by corruption.
Replacing the French as an authority figure, the
United Stales began Lo combat the same Vietnamese
political factions as had their predecessors. These
factions gained access to Laotian air transits to acquire
large quantities of opium to sell, making massive
profits. Ngo Dinh Nhu , the brother of South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem, was the first to decide Lo
restore the opium traffic after liberation from the
French in order "to finance his repression of mounting
armed insurgency and political dissent." 1° From 19581960 Nhu used Corsican airlines lo transport the
narcotics. Diem, who had launched an anti-opium
campaign in 1955, allowed his brother to perpetuate
corruption. By 1963 lhe United Stales rescinded ils
support of Diem and even encouraged his eventual
toppling from power, allowing his murder by military
coup.
Systematic corruption within Vietnam did not cease
with the fall of Diem. What resulted was a closely
controlled struggle for power between the three foremost leaders in South Vietnam: President Nguyen Van
Thieu, Vice-President Nguyen Cao Ky and Premier
Tran Thien Khiem. Thieu controlled the army, navy
and lower house of governrnent, while the air force was
loyal to Ky, and Khiem controlled the customs, port
authority, and National Police. Power was gained
through acquiring "control over a centralized narcotics
traffic," and each of the se political factions sought that

'

0

Ibid., 153 .
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control. 11
Leading political authorities in South
Vietnam often used American-established operations
to bring in opium. As early as 1961, the CIA conducted "Operation Haylift," hiring Ky and his First
Transport Group to fly American agents into North
Vietnam for intelligence reconnaissance missions. Ky
utilized this opportunity to transport opium from Laos
to Saigon. By mid-1970 each of the aforementioned
political institutions included high ranking officials
who were connected with opium trafficking, using their
authority to smuggle narcotics. Officials easily protected themselves and those loyal to them from persecution for drug trafficking because the entire system
was corrupt and because men like Ky and Thieu
clearly had enough political authority to pardon
individuals, and to lie about or deny their own involvement. Under the United S tates' nose, the opium
market continued to grow .
Such were the regions America sent its sons and
daughters to protect. Troops were immersed in a
society of corruption, bribery, and violence. America
was shocked to watch General Nguyen Ngoc Loan
execute a prisoner assumed to be Viet Cong in front of
U.S. television cameras on the first day of the Tet
offensive (31 January 1968). Following the efforts of
the South Vietnamese and the Americans, men and
women who had just barely reached legal adulthood,
witnessed the brutal effects of Agent Orange upon
civilians and landscape. They were required to participate in the decimation of en tire villages and some
witnessed while others participated in brutal rapes of
Vietnamese women. In fighting the Viet Cong, these

II

Ibid., 158.
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same young people were ambushed, and saw friends
and entire units literally blown up or shot. Vietnam
was hell on earth for the naive young Americans who
had enlisted or had been drafted.
The stress of war took its toll on the troops. Symptoms developed, presenting themselves overtly within
individuals and eventually pushing doctors to coin the
phrase "post traumatic stress disorder" (PTSD). Men
and women were emotional wrecks who could become
a liability for any unit. In Christian G. i\ppy's Patriots,
containing a plethora of memoirs by Vietnam veterans,
one army nurse explains how she could not sleep and
cried often, eventually seeking help from a surgeon
with the words, ''l'm falling apart here." His solution
was to prescribe Librium, which, as the nurse describes, "gave [her] a false calm." 12 Such prescriptions
were not uncommon, showingjust how easily medication could be obtained. Still some soldiers also medicated with self-prescribed marijuana and heroin. As
anti-war sentiments grew both stateside and abroad,
troops also began to use narcotics as a form of rebellion against a war they too opposed.
Gls were homesick and bored, searching for solace
and a means to dull the fear and exhaustion. Opium
was everywhere. Soldiers could find it at extremely
low prices from locals, ARVN officers, or other Americans with ranks as high as captain. 13 Troops smoked
marijuana often and sometimes obtained marijuana
laced with opium. The pungent scent of marijuana
smoke, however, was easily detectable, convincing
12

Chrislian G. Appy, Palriols (New York: Penguin Group,
2003), 172.
13
McCoy, The Pulilics uj' Heroin, 20 l.
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some to try less conspicuous substances. In late 1969
and early 1970, the Golden Triangle laboratories
refining opium into heroin finally achieved 80-99
percent pure heroin, dubbed heroin no. 4. A CIA
report from June 1971 concludes that the growing
heroin market in South Vietnam among U.S. soldiers
was the reason for the laboratories efforts to create no.
4. 14 After the widely unpopular spring 1970 invasion
of Cambodia, there was a surge in U.S. troops using
the narcotic.
At the hands of the South Vietnamese government
officials who protected the heroin trade, vying for
American addicts' money, drug-related deaths confirmed by autopsy doubled from 1969 to 1970 (from
eleven to twenty-five). Sixty-four more deaths suspected to be drug-related were not confirmed by
autopsy. 15 In 1971 an estimated 10-15 percent of lowranking enlisted troops were heroin users. America
began to fear that these addicts with low morale, who
practiced attempls on their ranking officers lives by
throwing hand grenades (a practice known as
fragging), would return home crazed and violent. U.S.
officials attempted in-country rehabilitation for addicts
to preserve the idea Lhal home was a peaceful haven
for their military, void of substance abuse and violence. Some addicts were locked into "big metal conex
boxes" for a few days, removed, sent to the medical
ward for rehydration, and then sent back to their
units. 16 On 22 June 1971 the U.S. military com1

I
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mantled that any GI leaving for home had to pass a
urinalysis. Only 5.5 percent of Gls did not pass, and
officials claimed that because only 8 percent of those
proven to be addicts injected the highly potent heroin,
addiction was not a serious concern. 17 These urinalysis percentages are inaccurate, however. Many factors
affected results: Gls were given second chances on
their tests; because testing was lax, many brought in
clean urine from another person; and many Gls
endured military detox or quit using on their own long
enough to pass the lest. 18
Gls passed their tests, but they still came home
addicted. Even in while middle-class neighborhoods
they sought out other addicts. Returning Gls increased the influx of heroin and opiates within America as they smuggled the drugs home or, more commonly, had drugs mailed to them from Vietnam. The
price of heroin in the United States was tremendously
higher than were prices in Vietnam. Some veterans
simply wanted a cheap fix, while others saw an opportunity to make money . America began lo realize the
extent of the trafficking when parcel after parcel sent
through military postal services was confiscated and
veterans were arrested for trafficking. One alternative
method of smuggling in heroin was by lucking it into
the body bags carrying their fallen cornrades. 19 In
August of 1970, a soldier was arrested for mailing
17

McCoy, ThePoliLicsofI-ieroi11, 219.
Ibid.
19
VI-fl Rocle Docs: The Drug Years, prod. VH I & The
Sundance Channel, 4 ep.isodes, 60min/episode, VH 1, 2006.
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$50,000 worth of heroin and cocaine. 20 Other known
cases had reported values of up to $1.75 million .
President Richard Nixon had already established
Operation Golden flow (urinalyses) and finally declared
war on drugs, opening several rehabilitation clinics
stateside specifically for veterans.
Returning Gls were not the only ones bringing illicit
narcotics into the United States. The U.S. military did
not widely acknowledge the immense drug abuse
problem within Vietnam until 1968. By then there
were already reports of increa sing heroin deaths within
the United States . In 1965 the organized crime syndicates followed America into the war in search of
greater profits. They struck gold in Southeast Asian
opium and began to smuggle it into the United States.
The mafia influence increased heroin and addiction
rates within urban areas. In the first six months of
1968, there were 450 drug-related deaths in New York.
Doctors were in uncharted territory. Research was
conducted to investigate whether overdoses were
caused by an "undiscovered virus," and terms such as
"snorting" crept into the vocabulary to replace "snuffing. "2 1
American military officials did not do enough for
the rehabilitation of their troops in-country. Many
thought illicit drug use was a sta in on their institution
and were embarrassed to report or even acknowledge
it. Others were simply more callous and thought all
20

"Ex-GI Accused of Ma ilin g $50,000 in Dru gs from As ia,"
The N ew Yorlc Times , 3 0 Au g. 1970 , ProQu es t 1-li s lorical
Newspa pers, 13 .
21
Tom Buc kley, "Narcotics Death s on Inc rease He re, " Th e
N ew Yorlc Times, 15 J\ug . 1968, ProQ u es t Hi s torical Newspa pers,
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users deserved what they got. Because so little effort
was made to truly help the afflicted, these young
people returned home to mingle with the rest of the
youth of America. They continued their drug habits
and influenced their peers. Psychedelia had already
broken the taboo of taking drugs, so there were many
who were eager to try. Addiction swept the nation.
The decline in soldiers within Vietnam did not
result in a decline of d r ug trafficking . Smugglers from
Southeast Asia, independent of U.S. military and
organized crime, continued to travel to America via
routes through Europe or across the Pacific to Hawaii
and California. In November 1971 the U.S. Bureau of
Narcotics estimated that 30 percent of America's
heroin supply had come from Southeast Asia. 22 That
number has increased to more than 80 percent over
the years. 23
A similar tragedy is brewing today: drug abuse by
American troops serving in the Second Gulf War is on
the increase. In this conflict-often compared to the
Vietnam War-Operation Iraqi Freedom is following the
blueprints for constructing another generation of
addicts and substance abusers. The Vietnamese
conflict finally forced recognition of PTSD, a disorder
which significantly impairs a soldier's morale and
judgment. The American public has been made well
aware of the casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan,
constantly learning from. news channels about the
latest helicopter that was shot down by insurgents or
22

McCoy, The Polilics of Heroin, 222.
Alfred W. McCoy, "Historical H.cv iew of Opium/ Heroi11
Production," Schaffer Library of Drug Policy,
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about mess halls destroyed by mortar shells. While
the numbers are much lower than the more than
50,000 American casualties of Vietnam, they are no
less extreme or dangerous to the minds and bodies of
those serving overseas today. Doctors are prescribing
Zoloft instead of sending troops home, and once again
many in the service are turning to the illicit use of
uncontrollable substances for solace. When asked
about huffing (the inhalation of such substances as
gasoline and aerosols) in-country, Sgt. Daniel Canada
of the National Guard spoke with a scoff: "There is
more than a problem with huffing. There is a huge
problem with prescription drug abuse and alcohol
abuse." 24 There are lessons to be learned from the
drug abuse resulting from the war in Vietnam. When
the United States deploys its military forces to far-off
countries, specifically tho s e like Vietnam and Iraq
where geography and the conditions of war both
contribute to drug abuse, addiction needs to be
recognized as a serious hazard facing servicemen and
women in the field. Addiction is just as, if not more,
deadly than insurgents, for it is a problem that remains even when the battles a re won.
24

Phone interview with Sgl. Daniel Canada, Norfolk, VA, 10
Feb. 2007.
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The New York World's Fair of 1939:
Marketing a "Corporate Utopia"
Renee Lucas
The year 1939 has been called a transitional year.
The nation was recovering from a devastating depression that left people at all levels of American society
with many questions about how and why such a thing
was possible. People were looking for security, and for
a solution lo economic depression. This brief luil
before World War II saw the celebration of the World's
Fair of 1939. It was heralded as the fair to end all
fairs, and as lhe largest World's Fair to date.' True to
the spirit of the limes, this fair represented a change in
ideologies and provided both a concrete and abstract
solution lo society's fears.
Through the fair, the
future of America was marketed by corporations as a
corporate utopia filled with happy educated competitive automatons.
Taking inspiration from the economically successful Chicago Exposition of 1933, a few businessmen of
New York decided to host a v;orld's fair to boost Lheir
own city's economy. It was the content of the fair that
they hoped would provide a long term solution to the
errors of humankind. The stuff of the fair focused
almost exclusively on technological advancement.
Indeed its theme was "Building the World of Tomorrow." Symbols of this world's fair embodied this
theme: the Trylon was a tall triangular obelisk, next to
it sat the Perisphere, a large sphere. Both were while
' Sidney M. Shale lt, "Epita ph for th e World's Fa ir" Harper 's
Magazine 18 2 (D ecembe r 19 40): 2 6.
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and sat at the center of the fairgrounds. The President
of the New York Fair Corporation, Grover Whalen,
described them as standing for the finite and the
infinite, as monuments to the community of the
future. 2
This theme was based on the belief that
technology and the rationality of science would create
a better world and would avert society from new crises.
Considering this, scholars have generally interpreted
the World's Fair of 1939 as an expression of elitist
goals to the masses. 3 It was not an idiom of popular
culture of the time. Robert Rydell stresses the importance of understanding the fair as "the product of an
effort by prominent New York civic and business
leaders to forge a weapon against the dismal economics of the Depression." 4 It created an atmosphere in
which scientists, designers and the men of capital in
society could display the version of the future they
hoped in .
This future would have a harmonious society that
was planned centrally, separating work from leisure.
These societies would be filled with communities in
which rationality would beget rationality, communities
where some agency-and the ability to err-would be
taken out of the hands of the individual, and placed in
the hands of technology. There was also a feeling that
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Ernest Schell, "A Brave New Future: The New York World's
Fair, 1939" American History Illustrated 24(4) (1989): 13; Robert
W. Rydell, "The Fan Dance of Science: America's World's Fairs in
the Great Depression," Isis 76 ( 1985): 540.
3
Nye, David E., "Ritual Tomorrows : The New York World's
Fair of 1939," HistoryandAnthropology6(l) (1992): 17.
4
Robert W. Rydell, "Selling the world of tomorrow: New
York's 1939 World 's Fair," The Journal of American History 77(3)
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technology could be used not only lo correct errors
humans made on their world but also errors in humans themselves. Thus , lhese engineered societies
would be filled wilh beauliful, smart and engaged
citizens.
IL is also nuled almost unanimously that for the
first time the World's Fair was dominaled by domestic
corporate interests, ralher lhan international economic
competition. The global aspect of this "World's Fair"
was crippled by the geopolilical climale of pre-World
War II Europe. Many nations had their exhiuil~
cancelled because of invasion or aggression. Americans could not have avoided knowledge of the tensions
and ideologies agitaling Europe in 1939. They were
troubled by the Nazi take over of Austria, were outright
angry about the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the
Non-Aggression Pact uelween Slalin and Hitler. Both
of the latter events happened during the course of the
fair. There was chronic anli-soviet feeling in the
United States and a growing uneasiness over the bold
beliefs of fascist countries of Europe. Understanding
these sentiments it is interesting that the idea of
engineered cooperative communities filled with engineered cuuperalive cilizens resonated with so much of
the American public. The model communilies of lhe
world's fair were sponsored by large corporations, most
notably automobile companies. These businesses
employed thousands and were advanced in their
production processes . Seen as strong symbols of
capitalism and the nemeses of socialism, these American corporations crafted lheir own solutions lo the
imperfections of sociely and marketed them as examples of the progress and prosperity they could bring.
It was utopianism wilh a u11iciuely American bent,
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where capitalism could care for people and a classed
society was perpetuated with room for advancement
and the achievement of the American Dream.
Though nearly half of the United States population
continued to live in rural areas in 1939, the cities were
growing rapidly and suburban areas were already
developing. Irrationally planned and lacking in the
virtue of nature, cities became the scapegoat for the
nation's problems . On the subject of city s lums Lewis
Mumford, an advisor to the fair and champion of
planned communities wrote that "the original residential areas are eaten into from within, as if by termites,
as the original inhabitants move out and are replaced
by lower economic strata; then these overcrowded
quarters, serving as an area of transition between the
commercial center and the better dormitory areas,
become in their disorder and their misery special
breeding points for disease and crime." 5 Not only were
the cities attacked for their disorder, the people living
within them were described as destructive pests .
Mumford's feelings mirrored the feelings of many of the
nation's intellectuals and elites . Both the irrationality
of the city and its imperfect inhabitants are regarded
as destructive and in need of guidance and repair.
Knowing that cities were indispensable to the
American economy and knowing that they would only
grow, there was an intellectual movement to clean
them up or at least to make the growing suburbs
efficient and beautiful. The fair itself was an example
of a planned community with everything provided for,

I
I

5
Lewis Mumford, The Culture of Cilies. (New York: Harcourt,
Brace, 1938): 206.
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planned out and color coded. 6 These ideas were also
modeled in the exhibiLs of Lhe 1939 World's Fair.
A most prominent example of Lhese models was
Democracity. Designed by Henry Dreyfus, this exhibit
was housed in Lhe Perisphere at Lhe very cenLer of the
fair. lls posilion served as a tesLament to the importance the creators of Lhe fair placed on Lhis exhibit and
the ideals it porLrayed. Democracity was a meticulously planned region where Lhe home and work were
visibly separated. Houses had Lheir fronL doors facing
inward Lo common green areas, as did the businesses.
Cars were relegated Lo back entrances and invisible
freeways. There were "Pleasantvilles" which surrounded the large business and shopping hub:
"Centerton". The PleasanLvilles were bedroom communities which served the larger Centerton. There were
also "Millvilles" where light indusLry was mixed in with
the homes and houses of these towns which, as
implied by their name, were involved in Lhe extraction
of natural materials. 7
It is inLeresling to note Lhal this "Democracity" was
not classless. Pleasantvilles and Millvilles were unelj_ual. CiLizens of PleasanLville had the benefit of
separation from their places of work, which is a goal of
central planning, while Millvillites had to live among
them. Again we can also see bias in the placement of
things. CenLerLon at Lhe cenLer obviously was considered to have Lhe most value, housing Lhe most impor6

Gardner Harding, "World 's Fair, New York" Harper's

Magazine 197 ( 1939) 193
7

Gardner Harding , "World 's Fair, New York"

Harper 's Magazine 197 (1939) l 93 Paul M. Folsch, "The

Building of a Superhighway Future at the New York
World 's Fair" Cullural Critique 48 (Spring 2001): 71.
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tant kind of work; the kind of work done by the bread
winner of the new American middle class. Farther
away from the beating heart of this organism were the
appendages which did the lower, more coarse work.
This placement implied that the aspiring American
would want to live in the Pleasantvilles and attend
their work in the heart of it all.
The name,
Democracity, evoked images of patriotism and involvement, implying that this type of city was the best
choice and what every American should want.
The most popular display at the fair, however, was
Futurama. This most visited exhibit was created by
Norman Bel Geddes, an admired set designer, and was
sponsored by General Motors. The display he fashioned was a miniature city of the 1960s, complete with
tiny cars hurtling along mini highways and parkways
at one hundred miles per hour. This structure of
roadways was created to be extreme ly efficient using
cloverleaf intersections and overpasses.
If these
inventions weren't enough to keep the cars moving
fluidly, there were towers along the roads which
purportedly controlled the speed and placement of cars
without any steering by the driver. This impressive
system of roadways would end up serving as a model
for the freeway system which would be created in the
next two decades. 8 The set gave the impression that
sleek fast cars were the solution to the problems of the
city. They would get the driver to and from work with
little stress, while allowing them to live further away
from the filth of the city.
8

Paul M. Fotsch, "The Building of a Superhighway Future at
the New York World's Fair" Cultural Critique 48 (Spring 200 l ):
67 .
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Cars were markeled not only as a low stress m eans
to get to and from work, but also as leisure lays and
status symbols.
Fast cars meant newness and
transition, a heady mix Lure for the citizen of the 1930s
stuck in a depressed and stagnant society. The
popularity of automobiles at lhe World's Fair is seen in
the fame and size of the exhibits of Ford, Chrysler and
General Motors. Dr. Gerald Wendt the direclor of
science and education at the fair articulated the
growing American obsession with automobiles saying,
"[In their cars] Lhey enjoy the sensation of motion, of
action, and progress" and continues, "Here they feel
too the sense of power and of control over their course
and destiny which is otherwise lost in their dependence on society." 9 Automobiles objectified the mobility
of the American people both literally and socially, and
owning a car became the goal of a large group of
working Americans . The large car manufacturers at
the fair, Ford, General Motors and Chrysler, made the
necessity and luxury of the car an indispensable tool
in the workings of the corporate utopia.
The ever forward looking creators of the fair were
also aware of the drawbacks posed by thousands of
individuals driving at high speeds. To avoid human
error many purposed taking some agency from the
driver and placing it in the hands of technology. In his
book Magic Motorways, Norman Bel Geddes states,
"These cars of 1960 and the highways on which they
drive will have in them devices which will correct the
faults of human beings as drivers." He continues,
"Everything will be designed by engineering, not by
9
Ernesl Sche ll, "J\ Brave Ne w Fulure : The Ne w York World 's
Fair, 1939" American His tory llluslraled 24(4) ( 198 9): 11.
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legislation," and finally says that safety "is not done by
law, but through the very nature of the car and the
highway." 10 This is a solid manifestation of the lagging
faith in human ability and increased reliance on the
advances in technology. Automobiles embodied a very
American sense of freedom and with this came a new
need to control this freedom within the new rational
society.
The religion of this new society would be science.
At the World's Fair of 1939 science was the pure
overarching thread that knit the fair together. Progress was made possible by science. Though not overtly,
there was a kind of worship of it as a new god which
would save the world from itself. There was only one
building at the fair dedicated purely to science, The
Hall of Man, yet it was a most conspicuous portrayal
of this new religion. The rotunda of this Hall of Man
housed an airplane he ld up by pillars which depicted
each of the pure sciences that contributed to the
creation of this machine. The next hall depicted scenes
from scientific history which described each step of the
scientific method. The point of the Hall of Man was to
illustrate the secret to success. That is, the use of the
scientific method. The straight thinking affected
through this method would allow the thinker to avoid
mistakes and come to new rational conclusions . This
building was so symbolic and richly adorned that it
was called a Cathedral of Science in which truth is
accepted without fear. 11 Though this exhibit was not
10

Norman Bel Geddes, Magic /vloto,wnys (New York: Random
I-louse, 1940) .
11
Rydell, Roberl W., "The Fan Dance of Science: America's
World's Fairs in the Great Depression," Isis 76 (1985): 541.
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sponsored by a company, it still bolstered the corporate institution and upheld its goals. Science was
presented to the common fairgoer as something above
them, literally through symbolism of the airplane
upheld by pillars of science and as something they
need not try to understand concretely . Dr. Albert
Einstein chairman of the Advisory Committee on
Science for the World's Fair said that this exhibit
would be "a dramatically visual program that will be
understandable and revealing to the average layman."
There would be no effort lo teach science. 12
The Hall of Man provided the fairgoer with faith in
the progress of science. The fair itself gave the understanding that scientific progress could only be made
through the use of corporations. In this way science
was taken from its place as something useful, a tool to
achieve ends and put in the role of entertainment and
emulation for the populous. lt was appropriated by
the corporations, allowing them lo be the owners of
innovation, and malting them the havens of rationality
and success. The extremely popular exhibits all used
every artifice available lo entertain the viewer creating
a halcyon presentation that induced their compliance
and acceptance of the corporate model of the future
with little question or want of detail. 13
This passive viewer was a specifically marketed
target, as was intended by the fair's creators. The
"World of Tomorrow" was sold to a particular class and
race . That is, the white family of the growing middle
12

"Science al Lhe New York World's Fair" Science 89 (1939):

310.
13

Nye, David E., "Rilual Tomorrows: The New York World 's
Fair of 1939," Hisloryand A rtlhropology6(1) (1992): 17
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class. This can be seen in the tour packages provided
by travel agents to the fair. They were instructed that
these prearranged tours were to be sold to "whitepeople" .14 There was, consequently, very little ethnic
diversity at the fair. Most telling of this fact were the
protests made by African Americans workers at the
beginning of the celebration due to their being relegated to menial and behind the scenes jobs within the
fair. 15 And although Grover Whalen stated, that this
would be a fair to delight and instruct the common
man, it most definitely was not directed toward the
"common man" who was himself reeling over the
recent depression. The admission for the fair in 1939
was seventy-five cents. However, once inside things
were more expensive especially the food. One might
end up spending five to seven dollars in a day. 16 This
was a huge amount considering the average wage for
a manufacturing worker was sixty-three cents per
hour. 17 In the end the World's Fair Corporation nearly
went bankrupt due to lack of admissions because the
common person felt the "World of Tomorrow" was too
highbrow for them. 18
Yet if the lower class and nonwhite people felt
14
Robert W. Rydell, "Selling the world of tomorrow: New
York's 1939 World's Fair," The Journal of American History 77(3)
(1990): 968.
15
"Negroes Protest to Fair" New York Times 16 March 1939
22; "Vote to Picket Fair: Negroes Chargin g Discrimination Plan
Mass Demonstration" New York Times 24 April 1939, 3.
16
"Menus and Pi-ices Vary Widely At Fair" Ne w York Times
28 May 1939 XX3 .
17
Brooks, John, "Anatollly of Change," Horizon 8(4) (1 966):
48.
18
"Fair Slash to 50c is Expected Today" New York 'J'imes 31,
July 1939: l.
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alienated from the fair, the middle class whites ate it
up, many of them returning lo the fair multiple times.
Possibly because they, more than any other Americans, saw themselves and an attainable future represented for them within the fair. 19 There was a marked
glurificaliun of lhe human body perfected at this fair .
The Hall of Man featured a huge nobly proportioned
man with a mechanically run heart which pumped
"blood" through out his transparent and accurate
body.20 The Social Hygiene exhibit outlined the most
effective ways of keeping the youth of the 1930s out of
situations where they might be tempted lo engage in
sexual activity with unclean persons. 21 Thus, not only
would the future of the middle class be beautiful, but
the family itself would also be fearless and pure. There
were also a very large number of peep shows and
scantily clad young women in public performances
throughout the fair. 22 One of Bel Geddes lesser known
exhibits, the Crystal Lassies was one instance of this.
The show consisted of a room filled with mirrors at
19

I

I

I

I
I
I

67

Gardner Harding, "World's flair, New York" 1-larper's

Magazine 197 (1939): 193.
20

Arthur H. Compton, "The Goal of Science" New York Times
5 March 1939, AS7; Man and his health; a guide lo medical and
public health exhibits at the New York World's fair,
1939,together with informalion on lhe conservation of health
and lhe preservation of life. New York, N.Y.: American Museum
of Health, 1939: 11.
21
Man and his heallh; a guide lo medical and public health
exhibits at lhe New York World's fair, 1939, together wilh
information on the conservation of health and the preservation
of life. New York, N.Y.: American Museum of Health, 1939: 7 172.
22
"Censor Descends Upon 'Sexy' Shows" New Yorlc Times 30
May 1939: 20.
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different angles. Into the room would step a young
white topless girl doing semi classical dances. Bel
Geddes gave the display culture by calling it art. 23
That this would be accepted was a testament to the
exemplification of the perfect body as artful and
idolized. This eugenic attitude was with the fair from
the very beginning. On the New Year celebration of
1939 an appropriately beautiful and blonde "Girl of
Tomorrow" hatched from a model Perisphere in Times
Square. 24 The fair was mimicking a wider movement
toward physical perfection. During the 1930s there
were the beginnings of sterilization laws as well as
propaganda to the white middle class to ensure
marriage to a physically perfect white companion. 25
These exhibits portrayed an attitude of adoration
toward a perfect white human body, implying that in
the "World of Tomorrow" not only would the problems
of the world be fixed by technology and social planning, but also the perceived problems of the human
race would be solved.
The Fairgoers may have enjoyed the things they
saw and experienced, however the world of the fair was
in reality a dream world. It was a place into which one
could escape from the dismal outside and after about
a year the fair was over. The United States could no
23

Christina Cogdell, "The Futurama Recontextualized:
Norman Bel Geddes's Eugenic 'World of Tomorrow,"' American
Quarterly 52 (2000): 216.
24
"World's Fair 'Egg' Hatches in Times Square and
'Broadway's Girl of Tomorrow' Sle ps Out" New Yor/c Times l
January 1939: 20 .
25
Christina Cogdel l, "The Futurama Reconlextualized:
Norman Bel Gedcles's Eugenic 'World of Tomorrow ,"' American
Quarterly 52 (2000): 214, 199, 203.
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longer avoid acknowledging war in Europe, something
in which it would soon be involved.
A lasting impression of the American Dream was
created in that year. Though the intellectual movement was one of planned societies and perfected
humans, there remained a distinctly American twisl Lo
these same ideas that were being proliferated in
Europe at the time. Specifically this ulopian society
was promoted by American corporations, not politicians or the common people. This meant there would
be continued competition and profit motive, two things
that have exemplified American capitalism. While
there was a tacit glorification of one specific race and
class, there was no era dication of social strata in this
American version of socialism. Social strata were still
very present in the type of society the elites projected
to the fairgoers . These classes were not rigid; there
was still chance for advancement and the risk of fall.
There was still a chance for lhe middle class family to
pursue material happiness.
This "corporate utopia" was not a popular movement it was an intellectua l movement impressed upon
the popular psyche. It was a top down influence which
was successful because il still allowed for Lhe realization of the American Dream. Only this dream for the
first time was defined by corporations and intellectuals
who were part of a greater movement toward societal
perfection which linked them lo European leaders and
thinkers. Soon however, these American leaders
would be involved with Europe by more than utopian
thought. The inescapable tide of war was rising on the
United States bringing with it both fear of the enemy-and their ideologies- as well as prosperity. Just
as the prolifically marketed symbols of the 1939
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World's Fair, the Trylon and lhe Perisphere were
dismantled to feed the growing need for war materials,
so too were the dreams of the fair taken apart and
changed. 26
Jared A. Fogal and Robert L. Stevens, "Dreams that You
Dream," The Official Journal of National Council for the
to
Dare
Social Studies 64(4) 2000: 203.
26
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Political Theatre and Political Myths:
Robert Kennedy, George Wallace and
the Show Down at Tuscaloosa
Christina Lynch
By 11 :00 AM on June 11, 1963 a political performance that would define two men's careers awaited
only the principals' arrival. Everything stood ready,
from the cameras and lighting to the marks on the
floor where the lead ac tor would sland. A national
television audience waited expectantly for the show to
begin. 1 Alabama Governor George C. Wallace, a
notorious defender of segregation, had cast himself as
the martyr and star of the show. Hungry for public
recognition, Wallace prepared lo give the performance
of his life. 2 The "good guy" in this political drama,
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, had sent his
trusted ally, Assistant Attorney General Nicholas
Katzenbach, to handle this final ballle over desegregation of the University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa. 3
Wallace intended to keep his promise lo the while
citizens of Alabama Lo stand in the door Lo Lhe uuiversity's administration building to block two African
American students, Jimmy Hood and Vivian Malone,
from enrolling in the while university. With the sun
high in the sky, 200 journalists from various media
1
Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., Robert Ke1tnedy and His Times
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1978), 341.
2
Peter N. Carroll. Famous in America: The Passion to
Succeed: Ja1te Fonda, George Wallace, Phyllis Schlafy, John
Glenn (New York: E. P. Dullon, 1985), 25 .
3
Schlesinger, 341.
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outlets present, and the nation watching, Wallace had
his moment in the spotlight. Wallace raised both
hands to prevent Katzenbach from entering the auditorium to register the two students. Katzenbach returned a few hours later for a second attempt. 4
The plol thickens, however. Kennedy and
Katzenbach were aware that Wallace, recognizing the
inevitable outcome of this mock battle, had sent word
to Katzenbach that on the second attempt, he would
step aside after saying a few words. The two black
students could then enter the university and enroll.
Wallace stuck to the script. 5 This carefully crafted
dimension of the day's events escaped the rest of the
nation, but achieved its goal. Both sides had appealed
successfully to their respective publics, and both won
praise for their performance. Though Katzenbach had
gone toe to toe with Wallace on that particular day, the
legacy of this political drama belonged to Kennedy.
Acknowledged as the voice for his brother's administration on the issue of civil rights, Robert Kennedy
emerged from the event as a hero of the Civil Rights
Movement, all the more so in the minds of many
because of his ability to reach his objectives without
using force. 6 Wallace also shaped his reputation
among southerners through his handling of this
moment; standing in the door cemented his status as
the last great southern defende r of segregation .7 It is
these legacies-Kennedy as a champion for civil rights
• Ibid., 337.
s Ibid.
6
John Lewis with Mi chael D'Orso, Walking with the Wind: A
Memoir of the Movement (San Diego: Harcourt Brace and
Company, 1998), 413.
' Ibid .
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and Wallace as a hold-out for the segregationist
south-that many Americans associate wilh the two
men to this day.
Historian Dan Carter argues that Robert Kennedy's
handling of the "s land in the schoolhouse door"
shuwed the American people the Kennedys at their
best. 8 Other historiar1s, including Robert Coles, Fawn
M. Brodie and Arthur Schlesinger, have popularized
this image of Robert Kennedy. Coles judges Kennedy
an effective moral leader who tried "lo do some good in
the world and prompt others to follow. "9 Brodie Lakes
her admiration a step further, placing Kennedy alongside Martin Luther King Jr., Mahatma Gandhi and
Abraham Lincoln . 10 Schlesinger, a friend of Kennedy,
asserts that Kennedy reacted more "directly" and
"sensitively" to the issues than any other political
leader of that era, making him the embodiment of the
American moral conscience. 11 Not all Kennedy historians agree with this image. Victor Navasky contends
8

Dan T. Carter, The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the
Origins of the New Conservatism, and the Transformation of
American Politics (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 155. A
according to Carter, the incident exemplified their careful
operational planning and close attention to detail, while John
Kennedy's speech on national television that evening turne<l civil
rights into a moral issue for the nation. Robert Kennedy had
proven himself an effective advocate for equality who did nol
need to resort to force or violence to accomplish his objectives,
turning Wallace in the eyes of lhe nation into somewhat of a
"pathetic footnote" in history .
9
Robert Coles, Lives of Moral Leadership (New York: Random
House, 2000), 39.
1
° Fawn M. Bru<lie, "The Political Hero in America: His Fale
and His Future," The Virgillia Quarterly Review 46, no. J ( 1970) :
46-4 7.
'' Schlesinger, xi .
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that Kennedy's most significant civil rights activities
were responsive, he notes, and not proactive. Moreover, Kennedy did not make civil rights a legis lative
priority because he believed he could reason even with
men like George Wallace. 12 Donald Jackson and
James Riddlesperger agree, con tending that after John
Kennedy's assassination, his friends gave both broth ers an undeserved reputation on civil rights . All three
historians refute the argument that a strong moral
conviction drove the brothers' support for civil rights. 13
The extent to which George Wallace lived up to his
historical reputation is also debated. Dan Carter writes
that the governor's political intelligence allowed him to
become the "defender" of southern racism while
escaping the racist "stench" attached to other Southern governors like Mississippi's Ross Barnett. The
Tuscaloosa stand-off contributed to this effect. 14 In a
1965 interview, Martin Luther King Jr. articulated a
view now popular among historians: "I am not sure
12

Victor S. Navasky, Kennedy Justice (New York:
Antheneum, 1977), 98.
13
Donald W. Jackson and James W. Riddlesperger Jr.,
"John F. Kennedy and the Politics of Civi l Rights," in Presidential
Leadership and Civil Rights Policy, eds. Donald W. Jackson and
James W. Riddlesperger Jr. (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1995),
95.
14
Dan T. Carter, "From Foster Auditorium to Sanders
Auditorium: The Southernization of American Politics," in

Opening Doors: Perspectives on Race Relations in Contemporary
America, eds. Robert J. Norrell and Ronald W. Rogers
(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1991), 68. Carter
stresses that Wallace raised the threat of violence only indirectly
so as to keep both John and Robert Kennedy "off balance and on
the defensive" and to make his own pos ition forceful and elu sive
at the same time .
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that [Wallace] believes all the poison he preaches, but
he is artful enough lo convince others." 15 Indeed,
playing into the public's emolions was a Lalent George
Wallace, who desperalely wanted to be admired, had
perfected. 16 Historians comment on Wallace's skillful
use of national media iu appealing Lo Lhe people of
Alabama; historian Marshall Frady calls the stand in
the school house door Wallace's "finest hour." The
theatrical nature of the confrontation was part of a
calculated plan to craft his historic legacy, Frady
asserts. Alabamans recognized that Wallace's confrontation would fail but "[w]hat matter[ed] [was] that he
fought and continue[d] to fight." 17 Southerners, he
notes, tend to love their heroes for defending a lost
cause. 18
If Wallace did not enlirely believe the "venom" that
he preached and Kennedy did not act because of a
strong moral conviction, why then did both men
emerge from this event wilh reputations that defy this
reality? Many historians acknowledge that Wallace's
legacy exists largely because he consciously crafted his
public image to make himself a star in white Southern
history. 19 Judgments of Kennedy differ so greally,
15
Martin Lulher King Jr., "Playboy lnlerview: Martin Luther
King Jr.," interview by Playboy Magazine, in A Testament of
Hope: the Essential Writings and Speeches of Marin Luther King
Jr., ed. James M. Washington (San Francisco: Harper, 1986),
373.
16
Carter, "From Foster Auditorium," 64.
17
Marshall Frady, Wallace (New York: The World Publishing
Company, 1968), 149.
18
Ibid., 171.
19
Dan T. Carler, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich: Race
in the Conservative Counterrevolution, 1963-1994 (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana Slale Universily Press, 1996) 4-5.
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however, that his moral intentions are difficult to
assess. An exploration of the staging of the desegregation of the University of Alabama reveals that both
men used the public nature of the situation to craft
their reputations. The way in which the legacies of the
two men were put to use overlaps; the sanctification of
Kennedy kept Wallace cast as the villain in history long
after the university was successfully desegregated.
Wallace needed to appear the villain for Kennedy to
emerge the hero.
Wallace before Tuscaloosa
The University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, had a
history with respect to desegregation long before
Wallace and Kennedy collided in June, 1963. The U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Brown vs. the Board of
Education of Topeka, Kansas in May, 1954 led to a
court order the following year to desegregate the
university. 20 On February 1, 1956, African-American
student Autherine Lucy enrolled and attended classes
for five days. With each passing day, resistance intensified until violence finally broke out. 21 The Board of
Trustees voted to expel Lucy on the grounds that she
had incited a riot. 22 ln 1963 the NAACP renewed its
fight for desegregation by supporting Vivian Malone
and James Hood in their application process. The
20
E. Culpepper Clark, "The Schoolhouse Door: An
Institutional Response to Desegregalion," in Opening Doors
Perspectives on Race Relations in Contemporary America, eels.
Harry J. Knapke, Robert J. Norre ll and Ronald W. Rogers
(Tuscaloosa: The Universily of Alabama Press, 1991 ), 40.
21
Ibid. , 43.
22
Clark, "The Schoolhouse D001-: An lnstilutional Response
lo Desegregation," 52.
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NAACP had good reason to try again; by 1963 Alabama
was the only state tha t h a d not desegregated higher
education .23
During his early political career, George Wallace
had not been segregation's most visible defender. In
fact, before his inaugural address in January 1963,
few Americans outside Alabama had even heard of
him. 24 In 1958, Wallace had run a populist campaign
for governor, promisin g better roads, better education
and increased industrial opportunities for
Alabamans. 25 About segregation he simply sta ted:
"[w]e shall continue to m aintain s egregation in Alabama completely and absolutely" but "without violence ." Violence, he argued, would only compound the
state's problems, and Wallace claimed to "advocate
[the] hatred of no man ." In a time when Southerners
feared social cha os, Wallace attempted a prac tical
approach and the preservation of segregation was far
from practical. 26 Though he did promise that "neither
my children, nor your children, will go to mixed
schools," his demeanor and emphasis ironically made
him the candidate of choice for the NAACP and the
Jewish population in Alabama. For white southerners
who felt that Brown threatened their way of life,
however, Wallace failed the test. 27 The far more
conservative John Patterson, pledging not to follow
23

Ibid., 60 .
Dan T. Ca rte r, "Legacy of Rage: George Wal lace a nd the
Tra nsforma tion of American Politics," The J ournal of Southe rn
History 62 , no . l (1 9 96): G.
25
Da n T. Carte r, "Fact, Fic tion a nd Film : Franke nheimer 's
George Wallace ," Pe rsp ectives (J a nua ry 1998): l.
26
Ca rroll., 2 6.
27
Ca rroll, 3 6 .
24
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federal laws like desegregation that he deemed "foreign," won the election. 28 Crushed by his defeat,
Wallace learned that moderation and practicality got a
politician nowhere in Alabama. 29
After 19 58, George Wallace reinvented himself
politically. He came Lo understand that white
Alabamans were more interested in rhetorical stands
than in what they could realistically achieve. 30 As
Wallace told his friends, John Patterson "out niggahed
me, and boys, I'm not going to be out-niggahed
again!" 31 Though he could not stop desegregation he
knew what his white constituency wanted to hear. 32
After 19 58, he devoted his efforts to increasing his
popularity by changing his rhetoric on civil rights. 33
The man who had been known as the "handshakingest candidate" in 1958 combined these "people
skills" with his new rhetoric, making him unbeatable
in Alabama. 34
Defense of racial purity was not purely symbolic; it
lay at the heart of Southern defiance .35 When he ran
for governor in 1962, Wallace feared another humiliating defeat but then he had a revelation; at first "I
couldn't make them listen, then I began talking about
niggers and they stomped Lhe fluor." 36 Increasing
pressure for desegregation led many Southerners Lo
28

Ibid ., 38.
Ibid., 38.
3
° Carter, "From Foster Auditorium," 69.
31
Ibid.
2
'
Frady, 96.
33
Carter, "P'rom Fosler Auditorium," 64.
34
Carroll, 25.
1
· ' Carroll, 25 .
36
Carroll, 40 -41.
29
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view lheir region as under siege. Wallace seized lhe
opportunity to capitalize on lhat insecurily. He would,
he promised, defend segregalion to the end. 37 In 1962,
the University of Mississippi at Oxford was under
court order to desegregale. When African-American
James Meredilh applied for enlrance, Mississippi
Governor Ross Barnett proclaimed that "No school will
be integrated in Mississippi while I am governor," he
declared.
"[Sjtand up like men and tell them
38
NEVER!"
Barnett's incendiary speech led to white
mobs' rioting at "Ole Miss" the day Meredith enrolled;
the resulting violence left lwo dead and 106 injured. 3 9
Nevertheless, Meredith did enroll and Barnetl had
made himself a Southern legend. The drama al Ole
Miss had changed the "segregation piclure," as the
New York Times commenled, and the "south [wouldjn't
be the same," nor would George Wallace. 40
Kennedy before Tuscaloosa
Raised a well-to-do Boslonian in a society where
blacks served mainly as maids and chauffeurs, Robert
Kennedy gave little thought lo civil rights and had no
feeling for lhe plighl of Africa11 Americans in lhe Soulh.
Even Schlesinger admilled lhal Kennedy only lruly
began to "think intensively about the problem" once he
had entered public offlce. 4 1 "I won't say I stayed awake
nights worrying about civil rights before I became
37
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Attorney General," Kennedy confessed. 42 Appointed as
attorney general by his brother, Robert approached his
new office with a distinct sense of self-importance and
a determination to dispel doubts about his qualifications. The equality of African Americans did not yet
figure in his moral universe, based initially on his
sense of obligation to his family and church. 43 All the
same, for someone so unconcerned with race issues,
Kennedy made some surprisingly strong statements iri
his first address as attorney general in May, 1961.
Regarding court ordered desegregation, he warned "if
the orders are circumvented .. . [the federal government]
will not stand by and be aloof. We will move." At the
same time, he called for "amicable, voluntary solutions
without going to court." 44 The response to this speech
surprised Kennedy and helped shape his views on civil
rights; rather than jeering, the University of Georgia
crowd applauded him for addressing race issues and
promising action. 45 Yet, it did not go unnoticed that
Robert Kennedy "refused to match his eloquent
speeches with deeds." 46 Martin Luther King and other
civil rights leaders criticized both brothers for not
moving fast enough. Civil rights had been a key part of
JFK's campaign oratory, and he had received the
endorsement o~ many civil rights groups. 47 Two years
42
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of inactivit y on race issues after such prom1sm g
campaig n rhetoric led many lo view the Kennedy s as
a disappoi ntment, and the "disastro us" handling of Ole
Miss, the attorney general acknowl edged, resulted in
48
the country placing blame "particu larly on me."
Setting the Stage
In January 1962, Robert Kennedy told the House
Appropr iations Commit tee that he felt "very strongly
that [the segregat ion] problem is not going to be solved
by just passing some laws. It will require some understanding. "49 The Kennedy adminis tration had viewed
former Presiden t Dwight Eisenho wer's use of troops at
Little Rock's Central High School as one of his greatest
policy failures, and yet governm ent restrain t had
50
Success with George
clearly failed at Ole Miss.
Wallace in Alabama was, therefore , even more
crucial. 51 Hoping to underst and the Souther n outlook
better, both brothers opened lines of commun ication
48
Robert Kennedy, "Interview with Anthony Lewis (with
Burke Marshall Present)," interview by Anthony Lewis,
December 1964, in Robert Kennedy: in His Own Words, The
Unpublish ed Recolleclio ns of the Kennedy Years, eds. Edwin 0.
Guthman and Jeffrey Shulman (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1988),
165.
49
Mark Stern. "President ial Decision-M aking in Two
Desegrega tion Crises: Lillie Rock Central High School and the
University of Mississipp i. " Jn Presidenti al Leadershi p and Civil
rights Policy, eds. Donald W. Jackson and James W.
Riddlespe rger Jr. (Westport: Greenwoo d Press; 1995), 96.
50
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51
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with the Alabama governor. A 1963 study found that
56 percent of white students at the University of
Alabama would be willing lo attend classes with black
students. 52 Yet, in a phone call on April 23, 1963 with
the attorney general, George Wallace insisted that
"there is no time in my judgment when we will be
ready for it [desegregation] -in my lifetime at least"
because "you just can't have any peace in Alabama
with an integrated school system." 53 Politics dictated
this statement; the governor had promised to challenge
John Kennedy's re-election plans on racial grounds.
"I'm gonna make race the basis of politics in this state,
and .. .in this country," he declared. For his own political survival he had to appear to keep his word. 54
Over the phone, the two men found no negotiating
space. Two days later, the attorney general arrived in
Montgomery for direct discussions with the governor.
Kennedy wanted to make clear that the federal government wanted no repeat of the Ole Miss disaster. 55
Both sides recognized that confrontation had become
inevitable because Wallace had focused the event
around his political career. Because Wallace had
promised to stand in the "schoolhouse door," his
reputation was on the line and he would be there come
hell or high water. As early as January 1963, New Yorlc
Times reported that the "showdown" between Wallace
52
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and the federal government was "expected" to occur
"sometime this year." 56 The attorney general insisted
that the law would prevail in Tuscaloosa, and hoped he
could reason with the governor. Should events come to
a head in Tuscaloosa, moreover, public efforts to
persuade Wallace to comply with the law would allow
the administration to claim that they had done everything possible to prevent violence.
Before arriving in Montgomery, Kennedy complimented the state of Alabama, its people and its leaders, asserting publicly-contrary Lu Lhe federal government's actual belief- that locals could handle the
situation. Although such flattery did not sway Wallace,
it did help Kennedy gain leverage with the American
public, including some white Alabamans. When he
arrived at the capital, hundreds of white Alabamans
greeted him, many with smiles and handshakes. 5 7 At
the same time, Wallace had his own game to play. To
make sure that Kennedy did not get too comfortable,
he arranged for 200 Alabama state troopers to meet
him at the capital. Kennedy understood Wallace's
intended warning: "The point was to try to show that
my life [Kennedy's] was in clanger. .. because these
people hated me so much." 58 From that point on every
action taken, every word spoken carried a political
message. The political drama had begun. America had
seen a brave attorney general enter hostile territory
through a mass of troops to negotiate with a Southern
governor for the civil rights of "negroes." For both
protagonists that image was worth a thousand words.
56

Charles Sillon, 12.

s, Schlesinge r, 18 2.
58

lbi<l, 338.

https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives/vol13/iss1/1

88

et al.: Historical Perspectives Vol. 13 2008

84

Historical Perspectives

March 2008

Kennedy understood the need to appeal to whites
in Alabama to prevent violence in Tuscaloosa. This was
particularly crucial for Robert Kennedy because his
political reputation as the administration's voice on
civil rights and perhaps even his political career were
at stake. Wallace and Kennedy had few discussions,
and the attorney general chose his words carefully as
their conversations were tape recorded. 5 9 Though
neither intended to back down ahead of a public
confrontation, both understood that they could not
afford a fiasco like Ole Miss. 'l'hey also recognized that
if this event went "right," and each played his part as
expected, both would reap benefits . Contrary to his
public statements, Wallace did not want to prevent
desegregation, nor did he believe that he could. Although he wished to appear to defend white
Alabamans'interests, victory in Tuscaloosa would have
labeled Wallace an irredeemable racist to the larger
American public, destroying the possibility of any
political career outside of Alabama. Wallace wanted
political invincibility in Alabama, but he also hoped to
move beyond his state into national politics. The
governor miscalculated; the "stench" did not wash
away, and his words and stand proved indelible.
The conversation that took place on April 25, 1963
in the governor's mansion had not been of the governor's choosing. He did not want to appear to have cut
a deal with the federal government and feared Kennedy
might leak information about their talks to the public
59
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lo make him look bacl. 60 Wallace, therefore, warned
that he would tape their conversation. Kennedy
consented. 61 "It was necessary, then, for both of us to
say things to each other on the basis that it was going
lo be played on the local radio station," recalled
Kennedy. "At least for me, I couldn't let anything he't.l
say go by as if it had been unanswered." Forced into a
situation where vague answers might be misinterpreted, the attorney general knew that he had to
match each of Wallace's statements with one of his
own. Kennedy put Wallace on the defensive by asking
if the governor really thought it so "horrifying" to have
"Negroes" at the University of Alabama. Wallace
responded by defending states' rights. When Kennedy
reiterated that the federal government intended to
uphold the Constitution, not violate it, Wallace asserted that, on behalfofAlabama, he would not submit
to these "forces of tyranny." The whole matter, the
governor continued, would end up in the courts, since
neither man was going to back down. Kennedy replied
that it was fine if the matter wound up in the courts:
"I just don't want it to get into the streets. l don't want
to have another Oxford." 62
Kennedy wanted Lo avoid another Oxford in large
part because it would reflect poorly on both him and
his brother. With John running for reelection and
Robert having presidential aspirations, they could ill
afford a repeat performance in Tuscaloosa. Yet, lo say
that on tape was hardly possible. He could state that
60
E. Culpepper Clark, The Schoolhouse Door: Segregalion's
Lasl Sla1td al lhe U1tiversily of Alabama (Ox.ford: Oxford
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61
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he did not want another Oxford without clarifying why,
leaving the interpretation of his words up to the public.
The public could assume that he had moral reasons
for avoiding another Oxford. Kennedy had played the
game of rhetorical manipulation just as well as
Wallace. "I don't want another Mississippi myself,"
Wallace retorted, "but you folks are the ones that will
control that matter-because you have control of the
troops." 6 3 Did Kennedy fall into Wallace's trap at this
point in the conversation, by responding that the
government would use "all the force behind [itj" to
ensure that court orders were followed? 64 His warning
did play nicely into Wallace's reference to "tyrannical
forces of government," but Kennedy recovered the
moral high-ground quickly, by saying that he was
"planning and hoping that the law [would] be obeyed."
"[M]aybe somebody wants us to use the troops," he
continued, "but we are not anxious to." The attorney
general recognized how scripted Wallace had made
their encounter. Wallace "didn't fear defeat as a
political pitfall," since that outcome was inevitable. 65
But like Kennedy, Wallace had to emerge from this
conversation with his political image untarnished.
The two made no progress toward a negotiated
settlement. Wallace intended to stand in the school
house door. Speal<:ing three weeks after his brother's
meeting with the governor, President Kennedy did not
mince his words. "For one man to defy a law or court
order he does not like, is to invite others to
defy .. .leading to a breakdown of all justice and order."
63
64

65
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But this time, he went further in his denunciations
than either brother had so far. To "subject other
human beings to acts that are less than human,"
Kennedy said, "degrades his heritage." 66 This speech
was critical for the Kennedy administration. The
President transformed segregation into a moral problem. Casting Wallace as immoral, he gave his brother
the opportunity to appear the champion of a righteous
cause . The President's words also appealed to Southerners' own sense of pride in their heritage and culture. In so doing, he depicted Wallace, not Alabamans
in general, as responsible for this action.
On June 5, 1963 lhe governor was placed under
court order not lo block the two students from entering the university. Wallace appeared on television that
evening to reassure his constituency that he intended
to defy the order. "I will not let you down in this matter
of standing for you," he promised .67 No one, including
the governor, wanted Wallace lo be arrested in contempt of court, but he needed to dramatize his dedication to the cause. 6 8 Those close to him later noted that
initially the governor had not meant his promise to
"stand in the schoolhouse door" literally but that he
now felt obligated to "play out this act of defiance." 6 9
He shared the federal government's fear of violence and
asked Alabamans to stay away from the campus;
violence by groups like the White Citizen's Council of
Tuscaloosa County posed a significant threat. As a
66
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precaution Wallace activated the National Guard to
maintain order, not to block the entrance of Hood and
Malone. 70
National attention shifted to the theatrical event
underway in Alabama. 7 1 No one really knew what
Wallace intended to do. Some reports pictured him
acting like a mad man. 72 The Kennedys had no reassuring contact with the governor by then. 73 As the
attorney general put it, "the great question for us was
not having to arrest the governor ... [or] charge him
with contempt, and not having to send troops
into ... Alabama-and yet getting the students [in] ." 74
Yet Katzenbach stated, "I think we should let Wallace
have his show," and Robert Kennedy agreed. 75 Appeasing Wallace would, they hoped, ensure that he
would not initiate violence. Yet the stand-off was not
aired on national television merely to appease Wallace .
The show could serve both sides. The attorney general
hoped to diminish Wallace before a national public
while making the Kennedy adn1inistration appear as a
champion for civil rights. Kennedy told Katzenbach to
"dismiss George Wallace as a sort of second rate figure,
wasting ... [everyone's] time, ca.using a great fuss down
there." 7 6
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Showtime
On June 11, Katzenbach met Wallace at the door of
Foster Auditorium, lea ving Hood and Malone in the
car. If Wallace blocked his entry, he would not be in
contempt of court because it would only be
Katzenbach whom he blocked, not the studenls. As
Katzenbach crossed the space between his car and the
door, journalists fell silent and the nation watched. A
profusely sweating, rumpled representative of the
federal government arrived at the doorway to find
Governor Wallace standing on the painted mark he
had requested to position himself in front of the door
for maximum camera exposure. Immediately before
that, Wallace had been pacing in an air-conditioned
room, so he looked markedly more composed than
Katzenbach. Wallace threw up his hands to block
Katzenbach, and th e two exchanged a few irritated
phrases, then Katzenbach, his face clearly showing
annoyance, turned away, arms crossed over his chest,
and disappeared into his car. 77
When Katzenbach reappeared a few hours later, the
scenario changed. Wallace had sent word that when
Katzenbach returned he intended to say a few words
and then step aside , letting the inevitable take place.
Wallace stuck to his script. The second meeting of the
two men, entirely staged for the benefit of the TV
cameras, captured the meaning of the day's events for
a national audience. Within two hours, the "stand in
the schoolhouse door" had ended without incident;
Wallace stepped aside and the two students registered
without interference from Wallace, the Klan or anyone
77
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else. 78 Vivian Malone later reflected, "I didn't feel I
should sneak in, I didn't feel I should go around the
back door. If [Wallace] were standing [in] the door, I
had every right in the world t o face him and to go to
school," and that she did. Two years later Malone
became the first African American to graduate from the
University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa. 79 Wallace later
apologized to the white people of Alabama melodramatically: "I can't fight bayonets with my bare hands." 80
Wallace had provided the Kennedy administration
with a perfect opening for the President's speech
declaring civil rights a moral issue. 81 Robert Kennedy
also capitalized on the success at Tuscaloosa in his
public speech on June 21. The attorney general urged
citizens to re-read the Constitution to discover the
moral principles that inspired the court and the
Kennedy administration's stand on civil rights. 8 2 The
headlines for the next several weeks in the national
media presented the attorney general as a civil rights
activist. The Washington Posfs headline for June 24
read "Rights Moral Issues, R.F. Kennedy Says." The
subhead for a New York Times' July 1 article on the
President's new civil rights legislation read "Robert
Kennedy to Lead off in Administration's Battle for New
78
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Legislation." He appeared on the cover of Time Magazine on June 21 under the headline "Civil Rights: A
Moral Crisis," followed by a quote from the attorney
general: "It is time to act in all of our daily lives." 83 In
the wake of this media onslaught, Kennedy emerged a
champion of social justice, all the more so given the
kind of coverage that George Wallace received.
Wallace received no sympathy in national media
coverage. The day after the stand, The New York Times
headline showed Wallace a defeated man; "Governor
Leaves" was really all the headline he deserved. 84
National disgust with Wallace placed the blame for
"The Great Sham Battle of Tuscaloosa," as the Times
dubbed it, squarely on Wallace's shoulders. 85 The
"show" put on for America's benefit was tainted by the
now public recognition that it had been a scripted
battle in a political game. And yet, white Alabamans
justified the Governor's actions as a defense of their
southern traditions. Alabaman Daisy Segal said, "the
great majority of [Alabamans] appreciate the stand
Governor Wallace has taken and are proud that [he
had] the intestinal fortitude to stand up and say no."
J\licc Starr agreed: "Cheers for George Wallace ... an
upright and courageous man ... fighting for the things
83
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we believe in." 86
For the next several weeks the media's coverage of
the event swelled. Three months later, on September
15, 1963 when the 16 th Street Baptist Church in
Birmingham, Alabama blew up as a result of a Klan
bombing, killing four young black girls inside, Alabama's governor earned the cover of Time Magazine as
if he were responsible. A rather nasty looking Wallace
was juxtaposed with a picture of a stained glass
window in the church that had remarkably remained
intact after the bombing, with the exception of Jesus
Christ's face, which had blown out. The headline read
"Alabama: Civil Rights Battlefield ."87 The symbolism of
the broken window made many Americans shake their
heads in amazement, and Wallace's picture underneath it added a whole new religious element to its
meaning. Wallace had entered an immoral battle, and
his actions were besmirching tbe face of Christ. Who
would not hate him after seeing that?
Wallace's stand, which he hoped would make him
nothing short of legendary in the South, came to
appear in a very different light. "Standing in almost
pitiable solitude against Bobby's forces," as Time
Magazine described him, Wallace looked "visibly pale
and trembly." Kennedy who had "rolled up his sleeves
and turned his office into a command post" was ready
to rumble. Though the reporter acknowledged that
many later suspected the Tuscaloosa incident had
86
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been a charade, it did not seem to maller because the
attorney general's tactics "had worked." Most importantly of all, the nation was convinced that "Jack and
Bobby Kennedy both genuinely believe in equal
rights." 88
Gentlemen, Take Your Bows
Race issues in the United States were finally on the
top of everyone's agenda, and Wallace, as he had
hoped, was at the center of it all. But by focusing
national attention on race with himself in the starring
role, Wallace became a notorious racist. Wallace
needed to undertake some serious damage control
when he ran for the presidency in 1964 and then again
in the next three successive elections. He insisted that
he had never had a racist agenda but rather intended
his actions at Tuscaloosa to serve as a "dramatic way
to impress upon the American people this omnipotent
march of centralized government that is going to
destroy the rights ... of the people." 89 He had not sought
martyrdom or personal glory. He tried lo dismiss his
infamous statement, "Segregation now! Segregation
tomorrow! Segregation forever!" by saying that what he
should have said was "Stales' rights now! Slates' rights
tomorrow! States' rights forever!" 90 He had never been
against black people; his words and actions had
nothing to do with race he insisted. Dan Carter argues
that nothing was further from the truth. Wallace was
unquestionably a racist yet it is also true that his
88
"The Long March" Time Magazine, Seplernber 27, 1963
vol. 82. no. 13, l. (accessed online 9 March 2007)
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stand at Tuscaloosa was less about race than about
himself. Later Wallace realized that making the history
books as a moral monster was not going to bring him
the political success he wanted.
In 1996, an ailing George Wallace apologized to
Vivian Malone for making his stand. He commended
Malone for conducting herself with such "grace,
strength, and, above all, courage" and presented
Malone, rather ironically, with the Lurleen B. Wallace
Award for Courage, named after the Governor's first
wife. Malone toid the former Governor that she had
long since forgiven him. Only Wallace knew for sure if
his transformation, from "racial bigot to friend of
African Americans" was sincere; however, "history will
undoubtedly remember the hard-core segregationist
George Wallace of 1963 and not the repentant dying
ex-Governor of 1996."91 Today the character of George
Wallace, villainous Governor of Alabama, is a mainstay
not just in Dixie's wax museum; it also haunts the
national memory of a lost Kennedy. Wallace never
successfully repaired his image because he needed to
remain the "bad guy" for Kennedy to remain the "good
guy" in American history . The nation's fascination with
the stand and the characters that history has created
of the two men has perhaps resulted in the erasure of
the real significance of that day. On the fortieth
anniversary of the desegregation Vivian Malone commented that "what I was hoping and what I'm [still]
hoping will happen ... is that we celebrate the opening
of the door, not the stand, not the attempt to close the
91

"Blocking the Schoolhouse Door: George Wallace Clears
His Conscience." The Joumal
of Blacks in Higher Education, no. 14 (Winter, 1996-1997): 68.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2008

I
I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I
I
I
I

99

I

al Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II, Vol. 13 [2008

Political Theatre and Political Myths

I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I
I
I

95

door." 92 Malone's hope has not yet come to fruition.
Wallace had turned the nation's attention to
important social issues of lhe times, but his uncompromising defense of them had sealed not only his own
fate but Kennedy's as well. The attorney general never
took personal credit for lhe clefeal of Wallace and even
less for the defeat ofracism in the South, but he never
corrected anyone who did give him such credit. Because Kennedy did not have to defend his actions in
Tuscaloosa, he also did not have to clarify his intentions behind them. Any more truthful retrospective
could only burnish the shine.
Assassins tried to kill both Kennedy and Wallace in
the years following Tuscaloosa, and succeeded in the
case of Kennedy in 1968. 93 On May 15, 1972, Wallace
was speaking in Laurel, Maryland, as part of his third
presidential campaign, when he was shot by a wouldbe assassin. Wallace survived lhe assassination
attempt but would be permanently paralyzed. 94 None
92

Vivian Malone Jones, "Vivian Malone Jones recalls the day
Wallace tried to block her from enrolling at the University of
Alabama." NPR, June 11, '.WU3, (accessed online 19 March 2007)
<http:/ /www.npr.org/ templates/ story/ story. php?storyld= 1294680>
93

Sorensen, 337; Lasher, 4 79.
Lesher, 48-481. A restless and boisterous crowd contained
hecklers chanting "Hitler for Vice President" and "bullshit,
bullshit" and throwing rocks, coins, tomatoes and other debris
at the lectern. Arthur Bremer, a twenty-year-old man wearing a
Wallace button on his coat lapel and cheering loudly for the
governor was so enthusiastic that television newsman Fred
Farrar instructed his cameraman to film him because "this guy
is weird. That smirk of his is almost spine-tingling." When
Wallace's caravan proceeded to the Laurel Shopping Center for
another speaking engagement, Bremer followed. After this
speech, Wallace approached Bremer lo shake his hand, and
Bremer shot the governor five times.
94
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of Wallace's campaigns for Presidency were successful
because his attempts at revamping his image had
failed. 95 Wallace had played the part of villain too well
and was unable to wash tha t racist "stench" away.
Robert Kennedy was killed on June 5, 1968 on the
evening of the California primary while running for
President. 96
The double assassination of Martin
Luther King and Kennedy in such a short period of
time (King was assassinated on April 4, 1968) grieved
the nation, especially the African American community. SNCC member John Lewis described their pain:
"First Dr. King then Bobby Ke nnedy .. .what could we
believe in now? How much more could we take?" 9 7
The assassination of Kennedy, like the attempted
assassination of Wallace, was featured on magazine
covers nationwide . Life Magazine perhaps encapsulated the nalion's sentiments best with its images . The
issue after Kennedy's death featured an image of
Kennedy alive and well , jogging on a beach with his
dog, the only words on the cover saying "Senator
Robert F. Kennedy." 98 The May 26, 1972 issue following Wallace's shooting featured a picture of the slain
Governor, bleeding and embraced by his wife with the
words, "The Wallace Shootin g" in large bold text,
95

Carter, "From Foster Auditoriu m ," 6 6.
Heyman , 497 .
97
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98
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nothing indicaling thal the Governor had survived. 99
This was lhe way America wan led lo remember lhe two
men: Kennedy alive and well, making progress, on the
move; Wallace, wounded and defeated. Tuscaloosa had
set these images in place.
99
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Missed Opportunities to Bridge the
Racial Divide: The Creation of the First
SWAT Team as a Response to Black
Radicalisn1

I
I
I

Bobby Philbrook
The l 960's were a perilous time for the American
establishment. Every disaffected group seemed to
suddenly find the authority to rebel against its perceived oppressors. From the anti-draft protestors, to
feminists, to far-left political activists, the federal and
local authorities deemed many different groups dangerous to society. Black Nationalists were a particular
threat to the established order because of their large,
urban population and the long-time forced docility that
fed a pent-up rage. For hundreds of years, AfricanAmericans had seemingly accepted white authority .
But the Watts riots showed what could happen if the
nation's long-oppressed African-Americans finally
rebelled against their powerless political situation and
abhorrent economic condition. Rather than viewing
the situation as an opportunity to address the reasons
behind the rage, the Los Angeles Police Department
treated the African-American community of Watts as
an occupying army would a foreign city. It met challenges to its authority head-on by creating a heavily
armed, commando-like squad of officers that would be
used against the Black Panthers, the Symbionese
Liberation Army, and other radical groups.
In the years following the l 960's, scholars produced hundreds, if not thousands, of works about the
period's radicalism and the response to it by authorities. Coming Apart (1971) by William O'Neill discusses
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the Watts rioters, the Black Panthers, and other
violent groups to argue that the 1960 's was a turbulent decade on the brink of social revolution. The paper
"Overkill" (2006) by Radley Balko details the equally
violent history of Special Weapons and Tactics teams
in America. This paper will make the crucial connection between the two histories, showing how radical
violence led to the creation of the first paramilitary
police unit in the United States . Today, cities of all
sizes utilize expensive SWAT teams for routine police
work. Although these teams have been romanticized
in popular film and on television as the final word in
law enforcement and civil protection, their actions
result in hundreds of mistakes annually, frequently
exacerbating ongoing racial and class tensions. The
Los Angeles Police Department's development or the
first SWAT team was a r eactionary response to 1960's
radical violence resulting in missed opportunities to
bridge the racial and class divide.
The African-Americans who rioted in Watts had
legitimate grievances about their living conditions.
While the rest of Los Angeles prospered and slowly
spread into the adjacent Sa.11 Fernando Valley, the
African-American community was increasingly
squeezed into a destitute urban ghetto. During World
War II, as African-Americans moved to LA to work in
shipyards and aircraft plants, they naturally gravitated
to the areas already occupied by other African-Americans. These areas segregated Los Angeles' blacks from
the rest of the city. Even the city authorities acknowledged that discriminatory practices by land lords and
realtors "created and accentuated the concentration
here [Watts! and made it extremely difficult, often
impossible, for Negroes Lo purchase ur reut homes in
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many sections of the city." 1 By the time of the riot, 88
percent of all African-Americans in LA lived in a fortysix square mile block in the city's south central clistrict.2 A litany of facts show that Watts, the main area
of the ghetto, was a powder keg of African-American
resentment, waiting to explode. In Watts, 30 percent
of adult males were unemployed. 3 There was no
hospital for a population of over 10,000 people. 4
Population density was 4.3 persons per household
compared to 2.9 for the rest of LA. 5 Even the conservative Los Angeles Times referred to it as a "ghetto
beleaguered by years of neglect. "6 Similar or worse
conditions existed in African-American communities
throughout the United States, communities that would
also erupt into violence during the 1960's. After years
of discontent in California, ostensibly a less racist
state than many, the Watts rioters, and later, the
Black Panthers, responded with violence to the discrepant conditions between white and African-American communities.
The Los Angeles Police Department was unprepared
for the spontaneous explosion of African-American
frustrations during 13-18 August 1965. Despite all
' The Governor's Commission on lhe Los Angeles Riots,
Violence in the City: An End or a Beginning?, In The Los Angeles
Riots, comp., Robert M. Fogelson (N ew York: /\rno Press, 1969) ,
84.
2

Ibid, 83.
William L. O'Neill, Coming Apart: An informal History of
America in the 1960's (New York: Time Books, 1971), 171.
4
Ibid.
s Governor's Commission, Viole1tce in the City, 86.
6
Robert Richardson. "Eig ht Men Slain. Guard Moves In," Los
Angeles Times, 15 Aug. 1965, <http://www.maynardije.org/
news/features/ caldwell/Chapter I 5> ( 15 Feb. 2007).
3
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the statislical and readily apparent disparilies belween
African-American and white communities, over a
hundred years of relative African-American docility
had given white authorilies the impression that
African-Americans simply accepted their condilion.
The riots began innocuously when a while police
officer stopped an inloxicated African-American
motorist. There was no beating or use of force by the
officer, but as Deputy Police Chief Daryl Gates, who
later developed and deployed the first SWAT team,
notes in his autobiography, perceptions are often more
powerful than facts: "rumors spread like wildfire after
the stop. The cops had beat up somebody's mother.
Or something. Ignited, small groups roamed the
streets.
Tempers, already flared by the heat,
snapped ."7 The results were more than a riot. Los
Angeles citizens watched an uprising unfold over the
course of five days.
The lack of preparation by city officials abetted the
riot's destruction. Since lhe city authorities had no
predetermined plan to deal with an armed urban
uprising, the rioters destroyed over 200 buildings, and
caused over $40 million in damage with impunity until
national guardsmen were finally mobilized. 8 By the
riot's end, thirty-four people had been killed and
another 1,032 injured. 9 The destruction rattled the
LAPD, which prided itself as the "thin blue line"
between order and racial chaos . According to Gates,
the rank and file police officers were not sufficiently
7
Daryl F. Ga les, Chief: My Life in lite LAPD (N e w York:
Sanlam Books , 1992), YU.
8
Gove rnor's Commission, Viule nce in Ute Cily, 22 - 23
9
Ibid .
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prepared to deal with the guerilla tactics of the rioters,
particularly the snipers: "We knew how to meet a mob
marching down the street... [But] rather than a single
mob, we had people attacking from all directions.
They were completely disorganized. We were just as
disorganized ."' 0 After watching their city hosl an
unprecedented display of violent outrage by AfricanAmericans, the LA authorities had to appear concerned with the riot's root causes or risk losing their
crafted image as a city immune to the racial clashes
that defined the American South. On 24 August 1965,
Governor Edmund Brown ordered a commission to
investigate why the riot happened and offer solutions
to prevent another incident.
The McCone Commission Report (MCR - named
after its chairperson, John A. McCone) addressed the
economic and social conditions of Watts, but, by
blaming class more than race, it offered ill-fitting
solutions. In his 1967 critique of the report, UCLA
sociologist Robert Fogelson summarized the McCone
thesis: "What provoked them to riot was not conditions
endemic to Negro ghettos, but rather problems peculiar to immigrant groups."'' Using new statistics lo
show that there were far more rioters than the MCR
originally claimed, Fogelson said the riots were not
"meaningless outbursts" by a disenfranchised minority
but were "articulate protests against the south central
ghetto" by a major portion of the Watts population. 12
Even when the commission recognized unemployment
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Robe rt M . Foge lson, "White on Black: A Critique of the
McCone Commiss ion Report on the Los Angeles Riots." In
Foge lson, The Los Angeles Riots, 114.
12
Ibid., 117.
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as the most immediate problem for African-Americans,
it declined to lay out concrete, practical solutions to
improve Watts' economy: "Other more imaginative and
more dynamic plans must be developed and must go
forward. This means all private employers must make
a more constructive effort to give the qualified Negro
an equal opportunity." 13 The proposals, however, were
voluntary. By not recommending new legal penalties
for discrimination, while business owners had no
incentive to rebuild Watts or hire African-Americans.
The commission also declined to support an independent civilian oversight board Lo review cases of police
brutality, saying such an action would "endanger the
effectiveness of law enforcement in a time when crime
is on the increase throughout the country." 14 As a
result, reporting and publicizing instances of police
brutality would become an essential part of the Black
Panther program a few years later and strongly contributed to its appeal among beleaguered AfricanAmericans. While the MCR offered empty rhetoric
calling for increased education, employment and
understanding between African-Americans and whites,
both black radicals and the Los Angeles Police Department Look concrete steps lo address the issues highlighted by the Watts riots.
The Black Panthers articulated urban discontent
and furthered white persons' fears of armed AfricanAmericans. In October 1967 Huey Newton and Bobby
Seale founded the group in Oakland. Inspired by
Malcolm X's organization and Algerian revolutionary
Franz Fanon's support of violence, the Panthers openly
13
14

I
I
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advocated "that all black people should arm themselves for self-defense" as a way to end police
brutality. 15 Seale and Newton studied gun laws to
avoid arrest when they brandished their weapons in
public, but were often arrested by Bay Area police
anyway, only to be released because the charges were
not binding. 16 The media, as well as the police, focused almost exclusively on the Panthers' weapons,
not the conditions that prompted them to arm themselves . In 1967, during the Panthers' armed protest at
the state capitol against a new gun law aimed at
limiting their right to bear arms publicly, Newton told
the New York Times that "ninety per cent of the reason
we carried guns in the first place was educational. We
made black people aware that they have the right to
carry guns." 17 But the guns served an unabashedly
Seale
functional as well as symbolic purpose.
preached to his fellow Panthers that "every time you
execute a white racist Gestapo cop, you are defending
yourself' and told them to organize small groups to
"take care of business" and "execute racist cops." 18
Not surprisingly, the Panthers' school lunch service,
political education programs, free tests for siclde cell
anemia, and argumenls againsl capitalism gained far
less attention from the media than the group's use of
firearms. By "explicitly mobilizing on the basis of
armed resistance," the Panthers appealed to African-
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Bobby Seale, Seize the Time: The Story of the Black Panther
Party and Huey P. Newton (New York: Random House, 1970), 68.
16
Sol Stern, "The Call of the Black Panthers," New York
Times, 6 Aug. 1967, Proquesl Historical Newspapers, p . 2.
17
Ibid, 2-3.
18
Seale, Seize the Time, 89, and, Stern, "The Call of the
Black Panthers," p. 3.
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Americans tired of waiting for white politicians to
correct urban injustice. 19 The mainstream media also
marginalized the Panthers as radicals not worthy of
serious attention by the white establishment. ln his
autobiography, Gates represents many other police
officers and white citizens who ignored the Panthers'
calls for justice. His focus remained instead on the
guns, presenting the Panthers'willingness to use force
as a direct challenge to law and order in the city: "The
Black Panthers sought power for themselves, not the
people. They were hoodlums ... They were mean. They
were violent. And that got them into trouble with
us ."20 The Black Panthers would soon face more than
the verbal scorn of the police: a paramilitary police
unit was designed specifically to deal with armed
radicals.
While the politicians toyed with social and economic reforms, the law enforcement community
brazenly demanded for a heavier presence. ln a
special issue of Current llislory (July 1957) dedicated
solely to the discussion of "problems of law enforcement peculiar to American conditions," one author
called for decreased oversight into police brutality
cases as it causeed officers to "avoid arresting Negros
because of the possibility of charges being brought
against them." 2 1 Instead, he called for an increased
police presence at civil rights marches and in AfricanAmerican neighborhoods as a means of preventing
violent clashes between authorities and demonstra19

Judson Jefferies, The Black Panther Party Reconsidered
(New York: Black Classic Press, 1998), 4.
20
Gales, Chief, 118.
21
Virgil W. Pclcrson, "Local and Slate Law Enforcement
Today," CurrentHistory53 (July 1967): 14 .
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tors. But more police was not the answer. As Gates
put it, the police "were universally despised. We (the
police) were pigs." 22 The LAPD saw Los Angeles as a
war zone in which all African-Americans were either
the enemy or collaborators. To fight this war, the
department needed not more officers or better understanding of their perceived enemies, but a modern
army.
The SWAT team in the LAPD was conceived as a
paramilitary unit designed specifically to counter
African-American radicals. In early 1966, Daryl Gates
brought in a team of ex-Marines to train a small group
of hand picked, ex-military police officers for what he
originally wanted to call the Special Weapons Attack
Team. 23 Gates unapologetically borrowed from the
military in the training of his new police squad: "We
began reading everything we could get our hands on
concerning guerrilla warfare. We watched with interest
what was happening in Vietnam. We looked at military
training."H The police officers trained in the desert
with military-grade body armor and weapons. Gates
later joked that SWAT turned out to actually stand for
"sit, wait, and talk," but the unit trained for gun
battles and assaults, not negotiation or restraint. 25
SWAT needed to prove itself as combat-effective .
Officially, the "gutty little rag-tag outfit" was assigned
to support regular police engaged in stand-offs with
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Mandalit del Barco, "SWAT History:/\. Series of High, Lows
in LA," National Public Radio, 22 July 2005,
<http://wwvv.npr.org/ tern pla tes/ story/ story. php?storyld =4 7669
98> ( l 6 Feb. 2007).
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snipers. 26 After Charles Whitman shot forty-six people
from a tower at the University of Texas at Austin in
1966, the LAPD had a crime committed by a white
person to conveniently justify SWAT, even though the
unit was conceived as a response lo African American
radicalism. But the unit was expensive and could not
afford to wait for another sniper situation to justify its
use of department resources.
Hardly a coincidence, on 8 December 1969 the
SWAT team's first major deployment was a shoot-out
with the Black Panthers. In an interview with National
Public Radio, Gates referred to the incident as "the
first time we got lo show off." 27 While the two officers
above him in the LAPD's chain of command were away
from the city, Gates, left in charge, made the decision
to raid the most fortified Black Panther stronghold in
lhe city. It appears that Gales timed SWAT's debut so
he could test his new unit and then take credit for the
victory (although he never admitted to it) . And Gates
left no doubt that victory would be achieved. To
assault a house defended by six Panthers, he deployed
the entire forty-person SWAT Team. 28 The Panthers
nevertheless held out for four hours before they finally
surrendered, just in time lo save their lives . After
being forced to retreat from the initial assault, and
expelling thousands of rounds of ammunition, Gates
called the Marines al Camp Pendleton and requested
that a grenade launcher be deployed, "primed and
ready to blast the house to kingdom come." 2 9 Despite
26
27
28
29
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Gales, Chief, 123 .
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his claims that SWAT was not a military unit and his
ultimate decision not to use the grenades, Gates was
prepared to destroy the entire house with a militarygrade weapon in order to bring its occupants to heel.
When Seale learned about the assault, he was
shocked by the department's wanton escalation toward
open war on city streets but r emained determined to
fight on. He told the other Panthers to avoid moving in
mobs, where "fifty would get killed, and 200 shot or
wounded" by the police. 30 He ordered his fellow
Panthers to move around in groups of three or four,
and to develop new tactics to use against the new
paramilitary police unit: "I exp lained to them that if
the pigs bring tanks down to our community, the
young brothas are going to have to use guerrilla tactics
to learn how to tal<:e those tanks, because those tanks
are brought there only to slaughter and kill our people."31 An escalation of violence had begun. Far from
deterring the Black Panther s' mission, the deployment
of SWAT hardened their conviction that the police were
racist murderers and that their own methods of
resisting police violence must also escalate.
The SWAT team solidified its role in the LAPD
during the shoot-out with the Symbionese Liberation
Army (SLA) on 17 May 1967. The media frenzy surrounding the assault advertised the benefits of a
heavily armed police unit to the entire nation. The
SLA was the final act of the era's violent radicalism
and "everybody's worst nightmare, but particularly
30
31

Seal e , S eize lhe Time, 23 6
Ibid., 237.
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anybody white and over forty." 32 Led by an AfricanAmerican revolutionary named Cinque, the SLA killed
an Oakland public school official, robbed banks, and
kidnapped and eventually brainwashed white newspaper heiress Patty Hearst. Two months after the kidnapping, the LAPD believed it ha<l the SLA cornered in
a safe house and deployed a full SWAT assault on the
South Central hideout, but "as in the past, it appeared
the members of the SLA sidestepped capture by a
matter of hours." 33 Hearst and her cohorts watched
the siege from another buiiding across the street and
Hearst later wrote in her autobiography about the
radicalizing effect of the extreme violence: "I sat there
on the floor in a stupor. I was a soldier, an urban
guerilla. There was no turning back. The police or the
FBI would shoot me on sight, just as they had killed
my comrades." 34 The SWAT team eventually caught up
with the SLA at another house. During the two-hour
battle, SWAT used Lear gas and 9,000 rounds of
ammunition in an assault on the house that ended
with six members of the SLA dead. 35 Television coverage, which was aided by helicopters and smaller
cameras, and the lack of serious police casualties
popularized SWAT, making it "a household name
throughout the world" and adding to Gates' burgeon-

I
I
I

I
I

I
I

I
I

,,
I

109

32

Joe Domanick, To Prolecl and Serve: The LAPD's Cenlury
of War in lhe Cily of Dreams, (New York: Pocket Books, 1994),
207.
33
Richard West "Silence, Then Gas, Bullets," Los Angeles
Times, 18 May 1974, J\l.
34
Patricia C. Hearst, Every Secret Thing, (New York:
Doubleday, 1982), 226.
35
West, All.

I
https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives/vol13/iss1/1

114

et al.: Historical Perspectives Vol. 13 2008

110

Historical Perspectives

March 2008

ing reputation as a visionary. 36 As instances of radical
violence sharply declined, the proponents of SWAT
took the credit and ignored a host of contributing
factors. Factionalism within radical groups, the end of
the Vietnam War, and a growing public distaste for
violence had discredited radical ideologies by the early
1970's, but Gates and other law enforcement officials
preferred to peddle the narrative that SWAT had
violently defeated America's domestic enemies. Emboldened by SWAT's success, they turned to convince
their critics that the unit could be adapted to confront
other criminal elements in cities throughout the
United States.
Although many police departments were impressed
by SWAT's early success in California, the unit was far
from a universal fixture in departments across America by 1975. Even in LA, Gates said the "quasi-military operation still offended some of the brass." 37
Police officers felt uneasy using paramilitary forces in
the communities they swore to protect. The chief of
police in Menlo Park, a suburb near San Francisco,
resisted forming a SWAT team and argued that the
macho nature of the unit created "cops who want to
solve all of society's problems with an M-16." 38 Yet by
1975, 500 SWAT units existed nationally. By 2002,
the number had almost tripled as teams moved into
obscure suburban towns like Leesberg, Florida (population 17,000) and Middles berg, Pennsylvania (popula36

clel Barco, "SWAT Hi s tory."
Gates, Chief, 115.
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tion 1,363). 3 9 ln the intervening years, the entertainment industry developed a fascination with SWAT.
Boasting actual SWAT learn members as advisors,
companies created a venerating 1970's TV show titled
"SWAT," a 2003 movie tilled "SWAT," and in 1995, a
video game franchise creatively Lille<l, "SWAT."
Through these media outlets, the public learned lo
accept paramilitary units as an indispensable and
praiseworthy part of every law enforcement agency.
Only recently have academic papers, such as Radley
Balko's '.2UU6 sludy "Overkiii," documented the thousands of mis lakes made by SWAT teams and started to
call their necessity into question.
Although African-American radicals engaged in and
advocated violence throughout the 1960's, legitimate
unaddressed concerns lay at the base of their actions .
Rather than viewing these explosions as desperate
calls to remedy long-neglected social and economic
inequalities, white authorities responded by creating a
special paramilitary unit with which they carried out
urban warfare. Today, the Black Panthers are gone
and organized radicalism is a memory of the 1960's.
Even as their original enemies vanished, the SWAT
teams remained an<l proliferated in hundreds of police
departments across the country, where they are now
used to serve warrants, raid suspected drug houses,
and do other work p reviously carried out by standard
police officers. Although no comprehensive figure
exists to show the exact number of mistakes made by
SWAT learns in the Uniled Slates, Balko documents
dozens of cases in vvhicb the learns assaulted the
39
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wrong address, shot unarmed people, and occasionally
were injured by surprised gun owners. Most tragically,
the LAPD SWAT team accidentally shot and killed a
toddler during the summer of 2005. 40 In an age when
violence is so frequently celebrated in popular culture,
and when terrorism and war dominate real-life, the
history of the origins of the SWAT team reveals the
need for a reassessment of the ultimate value of having
a dubiously capable, ambiguously purposed commando squad in every American city.
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